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The Moral Accountability of Advocates
William C. Hefernan*
Can an advocate ever be held morally accountable for the con-
sequences of a claim he advances while adhering to professional
standards? For more than two centuries, the weight of opinion
among lawyers has been that an advocate is exempt from moral ac-
countability as long as he violates no professional norm when fur-
thering a cause. During the nineteenth century, commentators as
diverse as George Sharswood, 1 James Fitzjames Stephen,2 Baron
Bramwell, 3 and Showell Rogers4 argued against accountability
under these circumstances. More recently, scholars taking the same
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New York. B.A., 1968, Columbia University; M.A., 1974, Ph. D., 1976, Harvard University;
J.D., 1978, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Rogers Brubaker, Jane Hurni, John
Kleinig, Barry Latzer, Allen Reiser, andJohn Henry Schlegel for their comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. Thanks are also due to Maribel Perez for her help in preparing the
paper for publication.
1 [The advocate] is not morally responsible for the act of the party in maintaining
an unjust cause, nor for the error of the court, if they fall into error, in deciding it
in his favor. . . .The lawyer who refuses his professional assistance because in his
judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge
and jury.
G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics 83-84 (4th ed. 1876).
2 No doubt it may be, and often is, morally wrong to exercise a legal right. It may
be unmerciful, vindictive, grossly selfish, and abominably cruel to do so, but this is
the concern of the litigant, not of the advocate. A legal right is a power put by
society at large into the hands of a private person to be used at his discretion. The
officers of the law, in their various degrees, enable him to use it, but there is no
moral difference at all between the advocate who conducts to a successful termina-
tion a prosecution instituted from the vilest motives, and the judge who passes
sentence on the verdict. No one blames the latter, nor ought one to blame the
former.
Stephen, The Morality of Advocacy, 3 CORNHILL MAG. 447, 453 (1861).
3 A man's rights are to be determined by the Court, not by his advocate or coun-
sel. It is for want of remembering this that foolish people object to lawyers that
they will advocate a case against their own opinions. A client is entitled to say to
his counsel, "I want your advocacy, not your judgment. I prefer that of the
Court."
Johnson v. Emerson, 6 L.R.-Ex. 329, 367 (1871) (Bramwell, J.).
4 A forensic advocate who pleads a cause the soundness of which he doubts or
disbelieves, is not in the same position as a party politician who votes in Parlia-
ment, or a speaker who appears on a public platform in support of measures and
objects which he disapproves. There is no moral obliquity on the part of the for-
mer, such as indisputably exists in the case of the latter.
Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy, 15 LAw Q. REV. 259, 267 (1899).
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position have included Zechariah Chafee, 5 Henry Drinker,6 Charles
Fried,7 and Murray Schwartz.8 Their thesis, which the earlier writ-
ers also shared, might be called "exemptionism," since it insulates
advocates from even the possibility of blame, provided professional
standards are honored while rendering service. Professor Schwartz
succinctly expressed exemptionism's central tenet when he argued
that as long as an advocate's conduct is professionally proper, he is
"neither legally. . . nor morally accountable for the means used or
the ends achieved" when furthering a cause. 9
Whether practicing advocates would agree with this can only
be a matter of conjecture. Clearly, though, exemptionism does at
least allow for an instrumental approach to advocacy which is both
widespread and easily recognizable. The key to this approach lies
in an advocate's zealous effort to maximize the legal advantages
available to his client. Personal opinions about the merits of a claim
are set aside. If evidence is morally relevant but damaging to a
claim, efforts are made to exclude it. Wearing down an opponent is
accepted as a matter of course. Even arguments about the justifia-
bility of a claim are developed for the sake of convenience rather
than conscience-and then are delivered with greatest effectiveness
5 "The doctrine of guilt by association is abhorrent enough in the criminal or
deportation fields without being extended into the relationship between lawyer
and client." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (1941).
6 Our legal system does not constitute the lawyer or the judge as to thejustness or
soundness of the causes committed to him, but deems it in the end of justice to
have all the facts and arguments on each side of the controversy presented by
expert counsel, stimulated to a maximum of industry by the contest, for decision
by the court and jury.
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 142 (1953).
7 [T]he lawyer must distinguish between wrongs that a reasonably just legal sys-
tem permits to be worked by its rules and wrongs which the lawyer personally
commits.. .. Consider the difference between humiliating a witness or lying to
the judge on one hand, and, on the other hand, asserting the statute of limitations
or the lack of a written memorandum to defeat what you know to be a just claim
against your client. In the latter case, if an injustice is worked, it is worked because
the legal system not only permits it, but also specifies the very details by which it is
worked. Your conduct as a lawyer is efficacious only insofar as legal institutions
have created the occasion for it. What you do is not personal; it is a formal, legally
defined act. . . . [Thus, if an injustice is accomplished,] we should absolve the
lawyer of personal moral responsibility for the wrong he accomplishes because the
wrong is wholly institutional. It is a wrong which does not exist, has no meaning,
outside the legal framework.
C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 191-192 (1978). See also Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE LJ. 1060, 1084 (1976).
8 "When acting as an advocate for a client, according to the Principle of Professional-
ism [i.e. within the constraints set by authoritative codes of professional conduct], a lawyer
is neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the ends
achieved." Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAIF. L. REv. 669,
673 (1978). Professor Schwartz, it should be noted, argues that nonadvocates cannot claim
immunity from moral accountability.
9 Id. at 673.
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by emphasizing the latter over the former. Once professional life is
considered in this way, a theory that encourages advocates to ad-
vance claims by offering immunity from possible moral censure is
bound to be attractive.
This article examines and challenges the arguments that have
been used to shield advocates from blame for their professional
conduct. By defining the scope of advocates' accountability, the ar-
ticle's first section aims at showing the appropriateness of bringing
moral considerations to bear on legal claims before they are ad-
vanced in court. The point may seem only too obvious, whatever
the weight of legal opinion to the contrary. Lay critics, for instance,
have long faulted advocates for their indifference to moral issues,' 0
while in recent years confessional memoirs by advocates seem to
have taken accountability for granted and so have offered justifica-
tions, interspersed with occasional handwringing, for causes ad-
vanced. 1' Those allowing for accountability, however, have
assumed rather than demonstrated the falsity of traditional argu-
ments against it. Lay critics, confessional lawyers, and even the phi-
losophers who have written on the subject 12 have tended to argue
past the denial of accountability and so have left it intact for those
who want to seize upon it.
The article's second section builds on the principles of ac-
countability established in the first by asking when advocates
should act on their moral concerns by refusing to advance proffered
claims. The most straightforward answer to this would be that con-
scientious refusal is warranted whenever a litigant seeks an unjusti-
fiable result. To recommend this for advocates, however, ignores
the values that can result from providing access to the adversary
process, and ignores as well the screening function the adversary
process often performs with respect to unjustifiable claims. If this
10 Some of the better-known jibes at lawyers include these: "They have no lawyers
among them, for they consider them as a sort of people whose profession it is to disguise
matters ... ," T. MORE, Utopia, in FAMOUS UTOPIAS 203 (1937); "The first thing we do,
let's kill all the lawyers," W. SHAxEsPEARE, KING HENRY VI, PART II, AcTr IV, Sc. 1, 86; "He
saw a Lawyer killing a viper on a dunghill hard by his own stable; And the Devil smiled, for
it put him in mind of Cain and his brother, Abel," S. COLERIDGE, The Devil's Thoughts, in
POEMS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 320 (E.H. Coleridge ed. 1912); "They utterly exclude
and banish all attorneys, proctors, and sergeants at the law; which craftily handle matters
and subtly dispute of the laws. For they think it most mete that every man should plead his
own matter and tell the same tale before the judge that he would tell to his man of law," T.
MORE, UTOPIA 126-27 (R. Robinson trans. 1935).
11 Recent advocate memoirs that have taken accountability for granted (and so have
presented only justifications for advocacy) include A. DERSHOwrrz, THE BEST DEFENSE
(1982);J. KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? (1983); and S. WIsHMAN, CONFES-
SIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1981).
12 See A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 90-155 (1980);
Cohen, Pure Legal Advocates and Moral Agents: Two Concepts of a Lawyer in an Adversary System, 4
CRIM. JUST. ETHics 38 (Winter/Spring 1985).
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screening function were carried out perfectly or nearly perfectly,
there would be little need to consider conscientious refusal at all.
However, as will be argued in the second section, it is because occa-
sions arise when the adversary process cannot prevent unjustifiable
harm that conscientious refusal constitutes an important option for
advocates. The second section, then, addresses both sides of a pe-
rennially troubling issue of advocacy. It asks when an advocate may
justifiably provide representation for an unjustifiable cause. More
importantly, it asks when representation cannot be provided and
thus asks when an advocate should decline to offer either zealous
service or any service at all.
Some points about terminology should be noted before turn-
ing to arguments designed to answer these questions. First, the
terms around which the paper's two sections are organized-"ac-
countability" and "conscientious refusal"- deserve brief discus-
sion. To say that a person is accountable for an event, it may be
suggested, is to say that he can fairly be asked to justify conduct
related to the event.' 3 Not all requests for an accounting can be
considered fair ones. One might argue, for example, that one's
conduct was not closely enough related to an event to require an
accounting with respect to that event; one might argue that the con-
duct was not voluntary; and so on. When modified to suit the spe-
cial circumstances of the legal system, denials of accountability have
actually been advanced along these lines on behalf of advocates.' 4
It is because there is no legal accountability for harmful but profes-
13 Circumstances sometimes arise in which individuals plausibly argue that they should
not be called on to justify their conduct since it would be unfair to hold them accountable
for the conduct itself. If, for instance, a person is coerced into engaging in a certain act, he
might argue that the act in question cannot fairly be attributed to him but must instead be
attributed to the person who coerced him. If coercion were shown, it would certainly be
inappropriate to ask the person subjected to it tojustify his conduct. It is because accounta-
bility denials are sometimes persuasive that the issue of accountability, when raised, must
be considered before turning to the question of the justifiability of conduct. Professor
Schwartz appears to have had this logical priority in mind when he wrote that "in proce-
dural terms, the concept of moral nonaccountability is equivalent to the filing of a demur-
rer, rather than an answer, to the charge of immorality." Schwartz, supra note 8, at 674.
14 The distinction between accountability and justification has not been adequately ap-
preciated in discussions of the ethics of advocacy. Denials of accountability for advocacy
have taken two forms: (1) claims that professional conduct is not personally attributable to
advocates (discussed in the first part of Section I of this essay); and (2) claims that, whatever
the resolution of personal attribution, the results of the adversary process cannot be subjects
of accountability because arbiters freely choose those results (an argument that is discussed
in the second part of Section I of this essay). Justifications of advocacy, by contrast, involve
an implicit concession of accountability for the likely consequences of claim-advancement.
Often-mentioned justifications (which are discussed in the third and fourth parts of Section
II of this article) are the following: that it is always justifiable to aid individuals in realizing
their legal rights; that advocacy for even wrongful causes is justifiable because it provides an
incentive to laypersons not to resort to self-help remedies; and that given the likelihood
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sionally proper conduct that the issue of moral accountability takes
on critical importance.
As used here, "conscientious refusal" refers to two options
available to advocates when asked to advance morally objectionable
claims: refusal to offer any access to the adversary system and pro-
vision of qualified access on condition that the litigant forgo objec-
tionable legal advantages accompanying a claim. While full refusal
is the more dramatic option (and is often cited by defenders of zeal-
ous advocacy when searching for a straw man to attack), this article
supports the provision of qualified access whenever it will not risk
significant harm to others. Qualified access requires agreement be-
tween a litigant and an advocate concerning the scope of the advo-
cate's representation. The second section of the article discusses
the propriety of advocate/client bargaining over the conditions of
service.
Two other terms that appear throughout the article should be
noted as well. First, "claim" should be understood not in a techni-
cal sense as referring to a plaintiff's request for relief.15 Instead,
"claim" should be taken in a broader, more colloquial sense as cov-
ering a party's assertion of fact (a claim that something is the case),
assertion of law (a claim of entitlement), or assertion of a combina-
tion of these elements. Given this broad definition of "claim," an
advocate's work can be said to center on claim-advancement for
laypersons. That is, an advocate can be said to give legal signifi-
cance to lay claims of fact or entitlement and to render zealous ser-
vice by exploiting the legal advantages that accompany these
claims.
Second, an "unjustifiable result" should be understood as a re-
sult which should not be reached given the morally relevant consid-
erations bearing on it.16 "Justifiability" is appealed to instead of
that some other advocate will advance a wrongful cause, there is no reason why the original
advocate asked for help should not do so.
A further distinction should also be noted. The defenses just mentioned can be
presented in across-the-board form (for accountability, these defenses have been classified
under the general heading of exemtptionism; justifications of this kind can be said to be blanket
in nature), or they can be presented as defenses framed in terms of a specific situation.
Both distinctions (between accountability and justification and between across-the-board
and situational defenses) must be borne in mind in order to come to grips with the moral
structure of advocates' professional conduct.
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)-(b) (distinction drawn between claims for relief on the one
hand and defenses and denials on the other). As used here in its more colloquial sense, a
"claim" can be advanced not only as a means of gaining relief, but also as the means by
which a defense is mounted (as when a party asserts he is not legally liable to a charge), or
by which a denial is made (as when a party asserts that another party's claim is factually
false).
16 The result at stake can be either a final judgment or a consequence of the working of
the adversary process. For example, an advocate might be concerned about the justifiability
of causing anguish to a complaining witness via severe cross-examination in the Lourse of
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"justice" for two reasons: (1) because antinomies within the con-
cept of justice can make a result just in one sense and unjust in
another;17 and (2) because the concept of justice does not, in any
case, exhaust the range of moral considerations relevant to possible
results of the adversary process.' 8 Whenjudges and juries perform
their screening roles properly, they consider both kinds of compli-
cations in moral reasoning. Advocates, it is suggested here, must
consider these complications as well when they have good reason to
believe that arbiter screening will not be effective.
I. A Theory of Advocate Accountability
Stated most generally, accountability is grounded in the rela-
tionship between action aimed at a desired result and the reason-
ably foreseeable consequences of that action. For advocates, we
may thus say that accountability is grounded in the relationship be-
tween the decision to advance a claim and the reasonably foresee-
able consequences of advancing the claim in the adversary
system.' 9 This seemingly unobjectionable principle is in fact open
to two exemptionist objections, one of which focuses on the personal
attributability of advocates' acts when they represent clients, and the
other on their causal responsibility for decisions rendered by judges or
juries. Each exemptionist defense raises significant difficulties for a
theory of advocate accountability. By considering each defense
with some care, it will be possible to vindicate the general principle
representing a client accused of rape. The justifiability of this proximate result will depend
in part on the justifiability of seeking the final one. However, even if the client is not guilty
of rape, certain kinds of questioning might still not be justifiable. It might, for example,
still not be justifiable to suggest on cross-examination that the complaining witness has a
history of unchastity when the advocate knows this is not true.
17 Notice is frequently taken of tensions between distributive, retributive, and commu-
tativejustice. Also, trade-offs are sometimes accepted between procedural and substantive
justice and between comparative and noncomparative justice. For discussions of the ten-
sions that arise between different versions ofjustice, see Feinberg, NoncomparativeJustice, 83
PHIL. REV. 297 (1974); Honor6, Social Justice, 8 McGiL L.J. 77 (1962).
18 It has been argued, for instance, that given the complexity of the moral considera-
tions that can bear on conduct, it can actually be justifiable to treat a person unjustly. Joel
Feinberg has suggested that "the realm of justice is not the whole of morality, and even
within its spacious domain, certifiable injustice is unavoidable." See J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 75 (1973). Another commentator states:
The just act is to give the man his due and giving a man what it is his right to have
is giving him his due. But it is a mistake to suppose that justice is the only dimen-
sion of morality. It may be justifiable [given other moral considerations] not to
accord a man his rights.
Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 599 (1968).
19 Thus, even if an advocate does not achieve his client's desired goal, he will nonethe-
less be accountable for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of seeking it via the adver-
sary process. For the implications of accountability for a likely result even when a client's
ultimate goal is not achieved, see note 39 infra and accompanying text.
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of advocate accountability just outlined and to show how it can be
applied to situations that arise in the everyday practice of law.
A. The Significance of Professionalism
Of the two defenses, the more far-reaching is the one that ig-
nores causal issues in order to focus on the personal attributability
of the acts advocates undertake as professionals. Advocates, it is
argued, are "not themselves" when advancing claims for clients.
They act vicariously; they are professionally required not to state
their personal views when advancing a claim; they follow rather
than create the legal formulae necessary to reach desired results;
their conduct in fact takes on significance only because of contex-
tual conditions created by the legal system itself. More than "role
distance" is at stake in this defense of advocacy. Clearly, an impor-
tant psychological gap is created when advocates provide represen-
tation for clients. Even more important to this defense, though, is
its claim that acts are not personally attributable to agents when the
meaning of those acts is derived wholly from institutional norms.
Advocate accountability, so this defense goes, is thus inappropriate
given the institutional context that gives meaning to advocates'
acts.
1. The Occasion for Service
The most cogent version of this defense can be found in the
writings of Charles Fried.20 According to Fried, only two condi-
tions need prevail for an advocate to be able to deny accountability.
First, an advocate's conduct must be impersonal; by this, Fried
means that an advocate's acts must be engaged in for others and
that the legal system in which an advocate renders service defines
their meaning as acts. Second, the legal system must provide the
formula for achieving a desired result. In Fried's terms, the "occa-
sion" for achieving a result must be provided by legal institutions.
According to Fried, the combined effect of these conditions is suffi-
cient to insulate advocates from accountability, a point he makes
clear in the following statement of his position:
[T]he lawyer must distinguish between wrongs that a reasonably
just legal system permits to be worked by its rules and wrongs
the lawyer commits himself. . . . [Ihf an unjustice is worked, it
is worked because the legal system not only permits it but speci-
fies the very details by which the result is reached. Your con-
duct as a lawyer is efficacious only insofar as legal institutions
have created the occasion for it. What you do is not personal; it is a
20 As an aside, it should be noted that Fried developed his position on accountability
while he was a law professor and now has an opportunity to test it in his new position as
Solicitor General of the United States.
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formal, legally defined act. . . .We should thus absolve the law-
yer of personal moral responsibility for the wrong he accom-
plishes because the wrong is wholly institutional.
21
Fried's argument, it should be noted, avoids two rather
straightforward mistakes professionals often make in arguing for
nonaccountability. One of them is to be found in the claim that
role distance is sufficient by itself for denying accountability. Catch
phrases for this include: "It's not personal;" "Don't take this per-
sonally;" and "Please understand, I wouldn't do this for myself."
22
However, factors such as disinterestedness in an ultimate result,
skill in reaching that result, and willingness to apply special training
in helping laypersons are grounds for praise when a goal is itself
laudable. They are not insulating conditions with respect to ac-
countability. If they were, then not only would advocates and other
professionals be unaccountable for wrongful harm, the list of per-
sons enjoying this insulation would also have to include contract
killers, soldiers of fortune, and anyone else willing to help reach a
questionable goal.
The second, and related, mistake has to do with the effect of
role-based behavior on accountability. The concern here is not
merely with accountability but with the supposed incommensurabil-
ity of role-based codes of ethics. That is, according to proponents
of this approach, each role can be said to generate its own moral
values, thus creating accountability according to the values of a
given role but not according to those of other roles. For advocates,
this has proven to be a particularly attractive way of limiting ac-
countability, for accountability can be conceded according to norms
established by professional codes and tt the same time be denied
when "lay" standards of morality are employed in censuring advo-
cate conduct.
Many difficulties accompany this balkanizing approach to eth-
ics, however. To give moral primacy to role-performance, for in-
stance, fails to take into account the negative value accorded many
roles. If role-performance or even the fulfillment of expectations
engendered by assumption of a role were sufficient for immunity to
criticism from other moral perspectives, then one would have to
assess contract killers and the like only from the standpoint appro-
priate for their roles. Furthermore, even if a concession were made
by focusing only on approved roles (with approval determined by
some method other than role analysis), the fact of approval for the
role would still not be sufficient to exclude the use of evaluative
criteria that questioned conduct designed to further the role's ends.
21 FRIED, supra note 7, at 191-92 (emphasis added).
22 For a review of these denials, seeJ. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw (1976).
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For instance, when assessing the conduct of persons acting as par-
ents or friends, we speak of parents' or friends' codes of ethics in
only a limited sense, for allowance is made for special solicitude to
be shown children or friends, but not for the active infliction of
harm on others in order to further the interests of those specially
cared for. A role-based valence, it may be suggested, is created by
parenthood or friendship. The fact that special expectations are
engendered by assumption of such roles does not mean, though,
that accountability disappears for harm done while carrying out
those roles. The same point may be applied to advocacy. For while
the expectations created by an advocate's agreement to serve make
it appropriate to show special solicitude for a client, mere assump-
tion of the advocate's role is insufficient by itself to insulate an ad-
vocate from accountability for the harm caused to others in
furthering a client's interests.
23
Fried avoids both of the mistakes just mentioned by focusing
on the occasion the adversary process offers for reaching a client's
desired goals. He does not ignore either the disinterested nature of
professional service or the fact that advocacy is carried out in the
context of a socially defined role. His key point, though, is that a
person is not accountable for harmful conduct when the occasion
for that conduct has been created and the formulae for it pre-
scribed by a socially approved institution such as the law. Under
these circumstances, he says, what is done "is not personal; it is a
formal, legally defined act" for which there cannot be personal
responsibility. 2
4
One must ask, though, why social creation of the occasion for
impersonal conduct should suffice for denying accountability. That
disinterestedness is not a reason for denying accountability has al-
ready been established. The fact that a role is socially approved has
also been shown not to be relevant here. What, then, is added by
the fact that the legal system "creates the occasion" for reaching a
desired result? This question can best be approached by consider-
ing whether laypersons (rather than lawyers) can deny account-
ability when they appear pro se in legal proceedings. 25 Dis-
interestedness and role-performance are certainly not at issue when
laypersons argue their own cases. By focusing on laypersons, it is
23 Alternatively, accountability could be conceded in the course of arguing that it is
always morally justifiable to show special solicitude for a client, no matter what harm could
foreseeably be done others as a result of this special care. This point is addressed and
rejected in Section II, Part 3 of this article.
24 FRIED, supra note 7, at 192.
25 It is not critical to Fried's argument (in the passage quoted in the text accompanying
note 21 supra) that a lawyer be the person who works an injustice via the legal system. A




possible to consider what significance, if any, the occasion for imper-
sonal conduct has on accountability.
When framed in this way, it is hard to see what is added by
Fried's emphasis on social creation of the occasion for-action. One
can agree with Fried that legislators and judges prescribe the means
by which landlords carry out evictions, by which debtors use stat-
utes of limitations to avoid otherwise meritorious debts, by which
spouses obtain harsh property settlements in gaining divorces, and
so on. One can also agree that when these results are obtained fol-
lowing pro se appearances, other people have created the occasion
for such appearances. None of this means, though, that when a for-
mal act (such as a pro se appearance) is freely undertaken, it is any
less attributable to the person choosing to undertake it. A landlord
who agrees to sign a lease cannot avoid accountability for this be-
cause the context for his conduct was formally defined. The same
point holds if a landlord later seeks an eviction-that is, given an
unconstrained decision to turn to the adversary system, a landlord
is accountable for his decision to do so and is accountable as well
for the likely consequences of doing so. Indeed, for pro se litigants
in general, there is accountability for a freely chosen act to use the
adversary system to reach a desired goal and further accountability
for the likely consequences of using it. Why should this conclusion
be different for advocates? No reason exists to distinguish the
layperson who chooses to use the adversary system from the lawyer
who does the same thing. Of course, grounds exist for distinction
on other points, in particular because lawyers act in compliance
with a social role and because, in most instances, they have no di-
rect interest in the object of litigation. As has been noted, though,
disinterestedness and role performance are not reasons for denying
accountability. Since the occasion for formal action also does not
provide a ground for denying accountability, one must conclude
that none of the factors mentioned so far can affect accountability,
although some of them (in particular, a disinterested willingness to
provide aid) can be relevant in assessing the justifiability of an ad-
vocate's conduct.
2. Professional Constraints
Alternatively, it could be argued that advocates act according
to professional obligations in rendering service, and that the effect
of these obligations is to insulate them from accountability since
they cannot choose the kind of conduct in which they engage. Ac-
cording to this argument, advocates can be held accountable for
their unconstrained professional conduct. Performance of a profes-
sional role cannot-at least according to this argument-be suffi-
1985]
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cient for a denial of accountability. However, by focusing on
constraints on advocates' freedom of choice, this argument only
modifies the rationale for avoiding accountability, not the conclu-
sion that advocates are unaccountable for their professional con-
duct. Murray Schwartz, in taking this approach, frames his defense
of advocacy as a personal statement an advocate can offer on his
own behalf:
I represent him [the client] because the system demands that I do
so. Moreover, I must cross-examine him and try to impeach
truthful witnesses, make arguments with which I personally disa-
gree, decline to introduce probative, adverse evidence against
my client, and attempt to present matter in ways I think person-
ally are inaccurate because the system demands that. You
[others besides the lawyer and client] may not hold me . . .
morally accountable for that behavior.26
This "constraint defense," as this might be called, should be
examined from an empirical and then from a moral perspective, for
it contains a claim about what advocates are actually obligated to do
and a further claim about the moral consequences (exemption from
the possibility of blame) that supposedly flow from advocate obliga-
tions. Empirically, there can be no doubt that advocates are not
professionally obligated to accept cases offered them. Also, there
can be no doubt that they may, within certain limits, withdraw from
cases already accepted. The Code of Professional Responsibility is
explicit on the issue of acceptance, saying that "a lawyer is under no
professional obligation to act as an adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client . .. "27 The Code also
permits withdrawal in matters not pending before a tribunal when a
lawyer's judgment differs from that of a client concerning an aspect
of the client's case. 28 The Model Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity may well allow greater scope than the Code since they permit
withdrawal if this "can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the interests of the client . " 29 In terms of profes-
26 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 673-74.
27 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 (1980) (hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE).
28 MODEL CODE DR 2-1 10(c)(1)(e). When representing a client, a lawyer may withdraw
from employment if his client "insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the
lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not
prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules." Id. This rule does not state whether the judg-
ment to be employed here can be moral or whether it must be merely tactical in nature. A
good reason to believe that the exercise of moral judgment is encouraged in this context
can, however, be found in the Preamble to the Code, where the authors state that "each
lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent
to which his actions should rise above [the] minimum standards" set by the Code.
29 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1983) (hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES). Rule 1.16(b) allows for one exception-that an advocate may not withdraw
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sional obligations, acceptance of a proffered claim is always a mat-
ter of choice, while some freedom is 'even permitted concerning
questions of withdrawal.
This relatively straightforward point about advocates' leeway
under professional codes provides a foundation for systematic rea-
soning about both advocate accountability and conscientious re-
fusal. It is important to pause at this point, though, to emphasize
the significance of an advocate's freedom to refuse service when he
concludes that the consequences of providing it would be unjustifi-
able. The agreement to serve, it may be suggested, carries with it a
"lock-in" device. That is, absent a special understanding to the
contrary, an advocate's consent to serve has the legal effect of bind-
ing the advocate to honor the professional obligations (in particu-
lar, the obligation of zealous service) which arise in the course of
advancing a claim. From a legal point of view, an advocate faces
three options, given this lock-in device, at any time when service is
sought and refusal professionally permitted. First, he can provide
unqualified access to the adversary process. 30 Second, he can qual-
ify access by noting obligations which, the advocate believes, would
be likely to produce unjustifiable results and by then seeking a liti-
gant's permission to waive or limit those obligations.31 And third,
an advocate can refuse service altogether, either because a litigant
rejects proposed qualifications or because the likely consequences
of even qualified service appear so wrongful that providing any rep-
resentation at all cannot be justified.32
when ordered by a tribunal to continue representation. See MODEL RULES 1.16(c). The
exception appears to have been broadly drawn, for it permits tribunals to order continued
representation even when withdrawal would not have an adverse effect on a litigant's case.
30 If an advocate does not obtain a client's agreement concerning the service to be
provided but nonetheless agrees to serve, he is subject to the professional obligation to
seek his client's lawful objectives and to defer to the client's decisions concerning harm that
might result from the means employed in pursuing those objectives. The Model Code calls
this the obligation of zealous service, and that is what it is called here. See MODEL CODE DR
7-101(A) (1). The Model Rules do not specifically refer to an obligation of zealous service.
However, Rule 1.2(a) employs the Code's terminology in stating that a "lawyer shall abide
by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation." Furthermore, the com-
ments following Rule 1.2(a) indicate that while a lawyer may reject a client's choice of
means on tactical grounds, the client's wishes must prevail even with respect to means when
the issue of possible harm to third parties is at stake.
31 For the Model Code's comments on a lawyer's right to qualify access before the com-
mencement of adjudicatory proceedings, see MODEL CODE EC 7-8. For the comments of
the Model Rules on qualification of access, see MODEL RULES 1.2(c). Both codes take the
following approach: (1) They allow lawyers to ask litigants not to press legal advantages
that might lead to wrongful results; (2) They require a litigant's informed consent for a
valid waiver of an advantage; and (3) They create rights of refusal for both parties: litigants
can seek other lawyers and lawyers can decline employment if the litigant rejects their pro-
posed qualifications.
32 The codes' authorization of refusal of service on the grounds of conscience prior to
undertaking representation can be understood by considering the conjunction of separate
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If attention is turned to the moral implications of these op-
tions, it should first be noted that they are consistent with the prin-
ciple of accountability noted at the beginning of this section; that is,
an advocate is accountable for the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of his decision to provide or deny service. Given this prin-
ciple, an advocate must be prepared to justify the professionally
unconstrained decisions he makes concerning service. Further-
more, an important implication of advocate accountability in this
context is that if an advocatefails to qualify the access he is willing
to provide, he is accountable for obligatory conduct that can rea-
sonably be anticipated at the time he is free to refuse service or
qualify it. This last point helps to focus attention on a dimension of
advocate accountability that requires particularly careful attention,
for it is by asking the baseline question of what he would be ac-
countable for if service were unqualified that an advocate can mean-
ingfully consider the alternative options of qualified access and
complete refusal. The significance of accountability for unqualified
access has yet to be determined, for if there is little chance harmful
results will be achieved when unqualified access is provided, then
accountability for providing it may not be a serious matter. That
there can be accountability for offering unqualified access is at least
clear, though, and it is on this basis further reasoning can proceed.
Before, however, considering the significance of accountability
for an unconstrained decision to serve, it would be best to review
the moral status of conduct undertaken to comply with professional
obligations. Professor Schwartz, I would suggest, is incorrect not
only in his empirical claim that the legal system "demands" advo-
cate representation of clients, but also in his moral claim that an
advocate can deny accountability in every instance when conduct is
professionally required. This normative claim is grounded in an as-
similation of professional obligations to duress, for Schwartz appar-
ently believes that the demands made by lawyers' codes are backed
by sanctions of such severity that it would not be reasonable to ex-
parts of each code. First, each code allows for refusal of service but says nothing about the
exercise of conscience with respect to this. See MODEL CODE EC 2-26 and MODEL RULES
1.2(c). Second, the authors of each code state that lawyers should consult their own con-
sciences in determining how to conduct themselves within the framework of their profes-
sional rules. As already noted, the Preamble to the Model Code states that "each lawyer
must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to
which his actions should rise above [the] minimum standards" established by the Code.
The Preamble to the Model Rules takes the same position. It notes that "the Rules do not
. . . exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply pro-
vide a framework for the ethical practice of law."
[Vol. 61:36
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
pect advocates to resist these demands when they arise in the
course of providing service.3
3
A constraint defense such as this can be sustained only if it
would always be unreasonable to expect advocates to anticipate (at a
time when service can be refused) the demands that professional
obligations will create. The rationale for this anticipation principle
is not difficult to understand, for it would not be plausible to allow
someone to escape accountability for constrained conduct when he
could have anticipated the constraints likely to be imposed on him
and so could have avoided them. It is because an advocate can
often anticipate constraints that qualified access and complete re-
fusal of service are important options. Admittedly, an advocate
cannot foresee every professional obligation at a time when he can
permissibly decline service. On many occasions, though, he can an-
ticipate these obligations and it would certainly be unreasonable to
allow an advocate to escape accountability when this is the case.
For foreseeable obligations, at least, an approach that emphasizes
justification rather than denial of accountability provides the proper
foundation for moral reasoning. In fact, in this context a denial of
accountability becomes a pretext for evading the burden of choice
posed by the professional freedom to refuse service.
What, then, can be said about obligatory conduct that an advo-
cate could not reasonably anticipate in time for discretionary re-
fusal? Schwartz's defense might be persuasive on at least some
occasions when obligations unexpectedly arise in the midst of ser-
vice. A verdict on this point would not, however, depend on the
issue of foreseeability; clearly, some kinds of obligatory conduct
cannot be anticipated in time for discretionary refusal. Instead, the
verdict would turn on whether the sanctions (in particular, the
threat of disbarment) backing professional obligations can provide
threats of sufficient severity that advocates cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to resist these threats. The point is a close one, at least with
respect to the threat of disbarment. Perhaps the best solution
would allow for the possibility of a persuasive denial of accountabil-
ity in this context, while noting that only rarely do occasions arise
which involve both unforeseeability and extreme severity of
sanctions.
33 The sequence of points that Schwartz makes about nonaccountability indicates that
duress is central to his argument. He seeks first to demonstrate the uncontroversial point
that a lawyer cannot be legally or professionally liable for his conduct as long as he adheres
to professional norms when providing representation. Schwartz then uses the fact of pro-
fessional obligations-"systemic demands," as he calls them-to argue for the controversial
point of moral nonaccountability. He states that "the Principle of Nonaccountability for the
Advocate proposed here goes [beyond legal and professional immunity] in asserting [that]
the . . . demands of the system also justify the moral nonaccountability of the advocate."
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 673 (emphasis in original).
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When only one of these conditions is present-when, for in-
stance, an advocate could have anticipated conduct but did not, or
when disbarment exists as a formal but unlikely possibility34-an
advocate once again faces a problem of justification and cannot
plausibly deny accountability. In this case the factors which deter-
mine what is now at issue-that is, the justifiability of violating a
professional obligation encountered in the midst of service-are
somewhat different than the ones relevant to deciding how to act
when conscientious refusal is professionally permitted. Ranged on
one side of this new justificatory equation will be expectations of
present service that professional obligations engender in specific
clients and the expectations of future service that these engender in
the general public. On the other side will be the risk and gravity of
harm to a third party from honoring a professional obligation. One
might argue that rarely should the prospect of harm because of fi-
delity to a professional obligation encountered in the midst of ser-
vice count as a decisive reason against service. Advocates, it could
be claimed, cannot estimate the damage to the general practice of
client representation from setting aside an obligation under these
circumstances. Even if this point were true, however, it would
merely underscore the necessity, in most instances, of justifying
conduct with respect to professional obligations rather than deny-
ing accountability because of them. Properly understood, such ob-
ligations rarely offer insulation from accountability. Instead, where
professional obligations are encountered in the midst of providing
representation, they must be taken as specially weighted factors in
an advocate's moral universe. Advocates in turn must assign them
reasonable weightings in determining what course of action is mor-
ally justified.
This said, it would be wise to focus in the remainder of the
article on situations in which advocates possess professional discre-
34 The formal threat of disbarment can be discounted for at least three reasons. First,
even in well-administered jurisdictions, only a small percentage of complaints result in dis-
ciplinary sanctions of any kind. One study found, for instance, that during 1969 to 1970
"only slightly more than 1% of [the complaints filed in California against attorneys] re-
sulted in private or public reprimands or recommendations of suspension or disbarment."
See Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 214-15.
Second, even after disbarment lawyers can often apply for readmission to the bar after a
stated period of time. California procedures, for example, permit an application for rein-
statement upon good cause shown and in the discreti6n of the State Bar of California after
a lapse of five years from disbarment. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6068, 6078, 6082 (West
1985). And third, the American Bar Association Committee on Professional Discipline,
chaired by Thomas C. Clark, found that, in a few states, even lawyers who had been dis-
barred or suspended indefinitely experienced relatively little difficulty in gaining reinstate-
ment. See A.B.A. Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 150-55 (1970). Therefore, the threat of disbar-
ment because of conscientious refusal to honor professional obligations must be consid-
ered extremely remote, and denials of accountability on this score will rarely be plausible.
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tion not to act-that is, on situations in which advocates can refuse
proffered claims or withdraw from service if professional obliga-
tions will require unjustifiable conduct. There are two reasons why
this narrowing of focus is worthwhile. One is that it underscores
the importance of producing a justification for unqualified service.
That is, if an advocate is in a position to foresee the kind of zealous
conduct that advancing a claim will require and can either qualify
service or refuse it altogether, then it will be especially important to
ask him why, given other available courses of action, he is nonethe-
less willing to settle for unqualified service. The second reason for
narrowing the focus has to do with the force of professional obliga-
tions that arise unexpectedly in the midst of service. While these
do not defeat accountability on most occasions, careful analysis of
the weight to be accorded obligations encountered while serving
can only distract attention from the general issues of accountability
and conscientious refusal. Rather than introduce such complicat-
ing factors into the situations that will be discussed, it is best to
emphasize now their possible relevance to decisions concerning the
justifiability of conduct. In the rest of the article, though, attention
will be confined to situations in which the consequences of obliga-
tions are foreseeable when an advocate is free to refuse service alto-
gether or to provide it on a qualified basis.
B. A Precatory Defense
Even if an advocate agrees, without qualification, to advance a
claim, the significance of his accountability for doing so remains
open to question. The advocate is of course accountable for asking
for something; and "asking" can be broadly defined in this context
to include not only assertion of a claim, but also zealous promotion
of it within the adversary process. One can reasonably wonder,
though, how important accountability for asking actually is, for
even when an advocate zealously presses a claim he can still be said
only to request a result that arbiters will then grant or deny.
Two factors, it might be argued on behalf of advocates, under-
score the importance of arbiter decision-making and thus the minor
significance of advocate influence in this context. One is that arbi-
ters (trial or appellate judges or jurors, depending on the nature of
the adversary procedure at stake) must pass on the claims ad-
dressed to them. It is in this sense, an exemptionist might note,
that advocates can be said to stand in a precatory posture toward
arbiters. That is, advocates plead causes of action, pray for relief,
submit evidence, and so on; indeed, no matter how zealously they
pursue claims, advocates always stand in a position of precatory
subordination vis-A-vis arbiters. The second factor that could be
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cited on behalf of a precatory defense is that arbiters perform their
roles while subject to a general charge to render justice according
to law. Given both factors, a precatory defense of advocates could
be framed in the following way: As long as an advocate has a rea-
sonable belief that arbiters will evaluate a request for a result ac-
cording to criteria morally relevant to the result, he should not be
held accountable for unjustifiable results sought and obtained since
he is entitled, at the time he acts, to rely on the assumption that
unjustifiable elements of his client's claim will be screened out
through the operation of the adversary process.
Even under this defense, an advocate is accountable for ad-
vancing and zealously pursuing a morally questionable claim.
Given the precatory defense just outlined, it would not be difficult,
however, to justify mere claim-advancement or even the zealous
pursuit of a claim, no matter how questionable a result sought
might be. Because an advocate can reasonably expect a division of
moral labor to prevail within the adversary process, so this argu-
ment goes, the issue an advocate faces is whether there are good
reasons to advance a claim; he does not have to consider the further
question of justifying the content of the claim itself.
As far as the content of a claim is concerned, an advocate can,
according to this argument, expect that arbiters will evaluate a re-
sult according to criteria morally relevant to it. As far as claim-ad-
vancement is concerned, numerous reasons can be offered for
providing service: to promote the public resolution of disputes; to
help laypersons by providing them with the kind of zealous effort
they would make on their own behalf if they possessed the skills to
do so; and to provide at least one person to counsel another when
the latter's interests are significantly threatened. Reasons such as
these-"access justifications," as they might be called-do not pro-
vide convincing justifications for service if zealous advancement of
a claim carries with it a strong likelihood of a wrongful result. How-
ever, if only zealous service is at stake-if advocates can reasonably
expect arbiters to prevent the occurrence of wrongful harm during
the course of a proceeding and can also expect that the final dispo-
sition of a claim will be proper as well-then access justifications
will often be persuasive in demonstrating the propriety of provid-
ing service.
Current professional codes lend significant support to the
precatory defense just outlined. Neither code deals explicitly with
the issue of accountability. Both, however, contain statements
designed to buttress the belief that arbiters will assess results
sought according to morally relevant values. The authors of the
Model Rules suggest, for instance, that only one variable-the pres-
ence of competent opposing counsel-need be considered in deter-
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mining whether justice is likely to be done. The Rules state that
"when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a vig-
orous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume
that justice is being done." 35 The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is even more definite on this point. By quoting a famous reply
by Samuel Johnson to James Boswell when the latter asked about
the morality of defending a bad cause, the Code's authors suggest
that advocates should never act on their own judgment but instead
should rely on arbiters' capacity to reach morally correct
conclusions:
Sir [Johnson said], you do not know it [i.e. the result sought] to
be good or bad till the Judge determines it.. . . An argument
which does not convince yourself may convince the Judge to
whom you urge it; and if it does convince him, why, then, Sir,
you are wrong and he is right.
3 6
Statements such as these are open to challenge not because of
the approach they take to accountability but because of the assump-
tions they contain about the adversary process. Given the preca-
tory role advocates perform, one must of course agree that their
accountability is rooted in the act of claim-advancement. However,
only when the risk of an unjustifiable result is itself low are claim-
advancement and zealous pursuit of a result relatively minor mat-
ters for which accountability can easily be discharged. The code
authors suggest that this likelihood is always low. They imply that
even when a litigant wishes to achieve a questionable result, an ad-
vocate need not concern himself with the result's moral status,
since the advocate will have good reason to believe that the legal
system's arbiters will screen out unjustifiable results.
It would be reckless, though, for advocates to accept code as-
surances on this point without further inquiry, for at least two ob-
stacles can stand in the way of effective arbiter screening. First,
rule-based constraints-especially evidentiary rules-can prevent
arbiters from considering information morally relevant yet damag-
ing to claims. These rules create "formal advantages," as they
might be called, for the furtherance of claims. The other obstacle
can be classified under the heading of "informal advantages," for in
this case persons advancing claims can benefit from known arbiter
preferences to exercise discretion in a favorable way. If one could
be certain that the legal system would make it impossible for advo-
35 MODEL RULES Preamble.
36 MODEL CODE EC 2-29 n.68 (cited with respect to a lawyer's opinion concerning the
merits of a civil case). See also 5J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF JOHNSON 26 (Hill ed. 1887): "A
lawyer has no business with the justness of the cause which he undertakes, unless his client
asks his opinion, and then he is bound to give it honestly. The justice or injustice of the
cause is to be decided by the judge."
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cates to deploy formal and informal advantages to achieve morally
justifiable results, the code positions would then be vindicated.
However, the opposite is a far more tenable hypothesis. Although
not every claim is strongly advantaged, certainly some claims are
accompanied by sufficiently strong advantages to make it foresee-
able at the time service is provided that arbiter screening will not be
morally effective. Claim-advancement, one can thus conclude, lies
at the heart of advocate accountability. When questionable claims
are accompanied by strong advantages, however, accountability be-
comes a far more serious matter than the code statements suggest.
The points just made allow for transformation of the precatory
defense into a theory that captures important and serious dimen-
sions of advocate accountability. The foundation for the theory was
noted at the beginning of this section: advocate accountability is
grounded in the relationship between an unconstrained decision to
advance a claim and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
advancing it within the adversary process. With the centrality of the
precatory role now clear, this can be seen to mean that an advocate
is accountable for the likelihood, foreseeable at the time service can
be declined, that the legal system will not prevent an unjustifiable
result from occurring. Four questions an advocate should ask cap-
ture the core of this approach to accountability. They are listed
below along with brief commentary on the implications of provid-
ing unqualified access to the adversary process. The comments fol-
lowing the questions help to identify the features of claims whose
zealous advancement can produce unjustifiable results, and it is in
this sense that the questions of accountability listed here set the
stage for an offer of qualified access or, if necessary, for complete
refusal of service.
1. Could one or more of the results of providing unqualified access be
open to moral challenge?
The codes concede the possibility that litigants can seek ques-
tionable results-that is, results that appear to be (and may or
may not actually be) morally unjustifiable. The two approaches
thus do not differ on this point. In fact, one can go further than
the codes and suggest that a mature legal system should not pro-
hibit litigants from seeking questionable results.
2. If no to 1, then an advocate is accountable for his decision
to provide unqualified access, but it is unlikely he will have a
difficult time providing a moral justification for what he has
done. If yes to 1, is there a significant likelihood that by providing
unqualified access a questionable result will be achieved?
The codes suggest that because of the effectiveness of the adver-
sary system's screening procedures, advocates need not worry
about the risk that an unjustifiable result will be the conse-
quence of claim-advancement. This point must be challenged.
What I am suggesting is that advocates are often in a position to
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know when the advantages accompanying a claim are strong and
when arbiter screening is thus likely to be cursory or nonexis-
tent. Once it is clear that the formal or informal advantages ac-
companying a claim are strong (and the professional obligation
of zealous advocacy, it should be remembered, often requires
the exploitation of such advantages), then a significant risk of a
questionable result can be posed by the precatory activities un-
dertaken by advocates.
3. If no to 1 and 2, then accountability for claim-advancement
would certainly not be difficult to discharge. If no to 2 but yes
to 1, accountability would center on the issue of why an advo-
cate chose to seek a questionable result which at best had only a
modest chance of success. Justificatory responses to this would
require balancing the value of providing access to the adversary
process against the inefficiency associated with pursuit of a re-
sult not likely to be achieved. If, on the other hand, the answer
to 2 is uncertain while the answer to 1 is positive, an advocate
would be accountable for seeking a questionable result whose
chances of success were uncertain, thus making the third ques-
tion, and if necessary the fourth, worth asking. Finally, if yes to
1 and 2, then an advocate should ask, is the result which is likely to
be achieved not merely open to question but actually morally unjustifiable?
According to the codes, the adversary system will rarely, if ever,
produce unjustifiable results. However, given the possibility
that formal and informal advantages can accompany a question-
able claim, this point simply cannot be treated as an article of
faith. Rather, if weak or nonexistent arbiter screening seems
likely with respect to a given result, it would be callous for an
advocate not to question the justifiability of the claim. An advo-
cate's significance in the adversary process, it may be suggested,
increases in proportion to any decrease in the expectation of a
strong arbiter role in evaluating the moral status of results
sought. Thus once the likelihood of arbiter screening is deter-
mined to be low, advocates requested to advance claims must
ask about the justifiability of results sought.
4. A "no" to 3 resolves the apparent difficulty raised by posi-
tive answers to 1 and 2, and accountability will be relatively easy
to discharge. If, however, 3 is answered positively, an advocate
must ask, given both the risk (question 2) and gravity (question 3) of
the harm that unqualified access could cause, are there nonetheless access
values of sufficient importance to warrant zealously seeking the result?
The codes ignore this question altogether, when it is actually
fundamental to conscientious refusal of service. As the risk of
achieving an unjustifiable result decreases or as the gravity of
the result appears less severe, the value of offering access to the
adversary process, it may be suggested, can provide an increas-
ingly strong reason in favor of service. Even when the risk of
harm is high, something of importance can still be realized by
aiding an individual who would zealously advance his own claim
if only he had the skill to do so. However, because of the impor-
tance of the injunction not to bring about an unjustifiable result,
only in a few situations will provision of zealous service out-
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weigh avoidance of an unjustifiable result. Conscientious re-
fusal should thus be adopted as a course of action when the risk
and gravity of harm are of greater importance from a moral
point of view than providing unqualified access to the adversary
process.
These four questions, it should be noted, do not hold advo-
cates accountable for all harmful consequences of the adversary
system. According to the general principle underlying the ques-
tions, advocates are accountable only for the risk, foreseeable at the
time service is provided, that an unjustifiable result will be ob-
tained. Laypersons who object to the defense of the guilty or to
some other type of service open to moral challenge often fail to
recognize this point, and so hold advocates accountable for any and
all results favorable to a client when these are actually obtained.
Accountability is warranted, however, only for what it seems likely
professional service will produce. Thus, if good reason exists for
an advocate to believe a result sought will receive careful arbiter
scrutiny, then the advocate can be held accountable only for con-
duct which carries a low risk of an unjustifiable result-with this
latter risk subject to counterbalancing by the value of providing ac-
cess to the adversary system and zealous service within it. This
point holds true regardless of the outcome of the adversary process
on a given occasion, although if advancement of a certain type of
claim unexpectedly produced an unjustifiable result on one occa-
sion, then risk assessment for similar claims would have to be differ-
ent on subsequent occasions.
3 7
The same argument underscores as well, though, the gravity of
advocate accountability when it is clear at the time service is pro-
vided that significant advantages do in fact accompany a question-
able claim. Once these advantages are discerned, one can no
longer say that a division of moral labor prevails in the adversary
process, nor can one reasonably expect effective screening when a
claim is advanced. The significance of rendering service is trans-
formed under these circumstances, for advocates then stand out as
critically important facilitators in achieving clients' desired ends
and not merely as providers of access to the adversary process.
Given this role, it is of course important that advocates consider the
justifiability of what they are requested to achieve-important, in
other words, that advocates take on the point of view normally as-
37 The principle of accountability could also shield from blame the advocate who in a
given situation seeks more than is justifiable because he has learned from experience that
this effort is necessary to achieve what is justifiable. This is a special problem of bargaining
accountability. If on a given occasion the advocate unexpectedly obtains the entire amount
sought by his client, it would not be fair to hold him accountable on that occasion for the
amount that exceeded justice. However, for the reasons just stated in the text, the advocate
would be on notice in the future about excessive demands in similar situations.
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sumed by arbiters, but which arbiters cannot be expected to assume
under these circumstances. Advocates may choose not to assume
this point of view. Many criminal defense attorneys, for instance,
go out of their way not to inquire into the guilt of clients with
strongly advantaged claims.38 Deliberate ignorance does not affect
accountability, though, for once it is clear that a claim is strongly
advantaged (and it would be professionally improper for an advo-
cate to fail to inquire into this question), moral culpability arises for
failing to ask whether a likely result might be unjustifiable as well as
for readiness to risk a known unjustifiable result. In either case,
important problems of accountability arise once it is clear that the
advocate could be providing more than mere access for a litigant.3 9
As for the significance of the sequence of questions just posed,
it should be noted that the most difficult questions are placed at the
end of the sequence, and so need only be raised if positive answers
are given to the earlier ones. The first question, for instance, func-
tions merely as a warning device for advocates. Given the kinds of
threats legal actions can pose to the interests of opposing litigants,
only rarely will a claim not involve the possibility of a result that is
open to moral challenge on some score. Advocates (understand-
ably) prefer not to confront the problem of determining the justifia-
bility of questionable claims, and if they worked in a legal system
that functioned perfectly in preventing the occurrence of unjustifi-
able results, they could always leave this question to arbiters. But
while it would be reckless for advocates in the current system never
to consider this issue, it is still preferable-given the broader per-
spective available to arbiters-that advocates assess the justifiability
of results sought only on those occasions when arbiters cannot be
expected to do so for themselves. It is partly for this reason that
the second question is included in the sequence. It is included as
well, though, because of the limited factual knowledge advocates
possess at the time they can permissibly refuse service. Given the
difficulties that can arise in determining the justifiability of a result
sought, it is preferable for advocates to address themselves initially
38 Richard Haynes, a prominent Texas trial lawyer, has stated that a criminal defense
attorney should avoid asking a client whether he did what he was accused of and should also
avoid asking what his client plans to do next. Taylor, A Reporter's Notebook: The Case of the
Guilty Client, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 16, col. 4. The tendency of criminal defense
lawyers to avoid the question of guilt is discernible as well in Edward Bennett Williams's
response to the question of whether he believed Alger Hiss to be guilty of perjury. Wil-
liams's answer was blunt: "He [Hiss] should have been gotten off." See Abrams, On Law
School and the Law: Some Observations of a Practicing Lawyer, 27 U. CHI. L.S. REC. 2 (1981).
39 The principle of accountability just outlined would hold an advocate accountable for
risking an unjustifiable result even if one were not achieved. Accountability is grounded in
the unconstrained decision to create a risk and cannot be avoided merely because a likely
result did not occur.
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to the issue of the likelihood of achieving a specific result. The sec-
ond question, then, functions as a warning device; for if the likeli-
hood of success is low (or if the result sought is not open to moral
challenge), then the more difficult third and fourth questions need
not be posed.
How the second through fourth questions should be ap-
proached will be considered in the section on conscientious refusal.
What should be noted now, though, is that all the questions posed
take on special significance because of the interplay of advocate and
arbiter authority within the legal system. As I have suggested, the
most important problems of accountability arise in situations where
strong formal and informal advantages exist and where arbiters are
thus likely to grant a result if it is sought. In some of these situa-
tions, reform measures-modifying the content of specific rules,
limiting the scope of arbiter discretion, and so on-shotild of
course be considered. It can be taken as a given, though, that no
matter how much reform is undertaken, some per se rules will con-
tinue to constrain arbiter choice and some discretionary rules will
allow for wide exercise of arbiter preferences. Furthermore, it is
also likely that advocate discretion to accept or reject employment
will continue to complement the distribution of constraint and dis-
cretion in arbiter authority. Given this relationship between the
different roles within the adversary system, the power to initiate
claims will make advocate accountability an issue of perennial im-
portance in those situations in which it cannot reasonably be ex-
pected that arbiters will be able (in the case of formal advantages)
or willing (in the case of informal ones) to deny the results sought.-
When viewed in this light, advocate authority either to refuse
service altogether or to offer only qualified access functions as a
final equitable safeguard for the legal system. Where, for instance,
per se rules are desirable because of possible abuses of arbiter dis-
cretion, situations will arise in which advocates can best act by
either not acting or by conditioning service on the waiver of a for-
mal advantage accompanying a claim. And where arbiters are
vested with discretion, inaction or qualified access may also be the
preferred course once the likelihood of unjustifiable harm is clear.
Advocate discretion need not be exercised frequently in this way. If
the legal system regularly produces unjustifiable results with re-
spect to a given type of claim, then legislative or judicial reform of
the rules of law would be desirable. If, however, a rule usually pro-
duces justifiable results but can be predicted not to do so in a given
situation, advocate exercise of discretion concerning the kind of
service to be provided would be preferable to law reform. When
used sparingly, this equitable discretion would leave intact the
structure of generally desirable rules, while mitigating the inflexible
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effect of formal rules and promoting avoidance of unjustifiable re-
sults when arbiter discretion is likely to be used in an objectionable
way.
II. Conscientious Refusal
Even if one were to agree that some claims should not be ad-
vanced or some advantages forgone, the question would still arise
whether claims fitting this description can be identified with suffi-
cient precision to prevent rejection of others deserving advance-
ment. This point takes on particular significance in light of the
positive values realized by providing access. For if the adversary
process provides generally effective screening mechanisms, then an
advocate should pursue all justifiable results and some unjustifiable
ones. In fact, in a generally effective screening system, conscien-
tious refusal would apply only to strongly positioned claims that
also seek unjustifiable results.
The problems surrounding identification of strongly posi-
tioned, unjustifiable claims are perspectival in nature. For while it
may often be apparent after action has been taken that refusal of
some kind 40 would have been warranted, this does not mean it
would have been feasible to make this determination at a time when
refusal was possible. In particular, two perspectival difficulties deserve
consideration in this context. One, which focuses on tactical con-
siderations, relates to the reliability of advocate assessments of the
advantages accompanying a claim. The other, which focuses on the
fallibility of moral judgment, deals with the possibility of harm to
litigants if an advocate mistakenly determines a result sought is un-
justifiable and so refuses to take the steps needed to reach it.
No defender of conscientious refusal could argue that these
points are always without force. Perspectival difficulties arise so
frequently in the course of advocacy that some caution is of course
needed in considering conscientious refusal. The issue to be con-
fronted, though, is whether chronic doubt must always accompany
attempts to answer the four questions of accountability. Given the
perspectival difficulties just mentioned, it seems only fair to assign
to proponents of conscientious refusal the burden of showing that
situations actually do arise in which advocates can entertain strong
convictions about the positive answers they give to the four ques-
tions. Furthermore, this burden should apply to refusal at a time
when it is professionally permitted. That is, it might be possible to
40 It should be recalled that "refusal" here includes not only complete refusal to pro-
vide access to the adversary process, but also qualification of access on condition that the
litigant forgo objectionable legal advantages accompanying a claim. See text at page 40
supra. Thus, "refusal" in this part of the article does not mean that when refusal is war-
ranted, access to the adversary process should be completely denied.
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show that perspectival difficulties are not severe during a trial or
when an appeal is pending. However, given the harm refusal in the
midst of a trial can cause litigants, this kind of refusal should be
treated only as an option of last resort and should not be used in
inquiring into the feasibility of overcoming perspectival difficulties.
Instead, the goal should be to identify situations without severe
perspectival problems when advocates can permissibly refuse ser-
vice. If the features of such situations can be identified, then re-
fusal, it can fairly be said, can correct screening defects in the
adversary process. If, on the other hand, no such situations can be
identified, then refusal could still be considered worthwhile in the-
ory but would have to be deemed unworkable in practice given the
perspectival problems that arise in the course of providing service.
Because of the special importance of the perspectival difficul-
ties just mentioned, attention will be given primarily to them-and
to the second and third questions of accountability that are relevant
to them-in the analysis that follows. We should begin, though,
with the first question, which only asks whether the results of ad-
vancing a claim would be open to question, and so does not involve
the perspectival difficulties that arise with the second and third
questions. As was noted earlier, the first question is designed
merely to trigger further inquiry, for it is the rare claim that falls
below the warning threshold the question establishes. To be cer-
tain a claim or at least one of the results it seeks is not open to some
kind of moral objection, an advocate would need good reason to
believe that the facts alleged are true and that no morally significant
interest could be jeopardized by pursuing any of the results that
could be achieved in advancing the claim. These conditions can, on
occasion, be met. Generally, though, morally significant interests
are ranged on each side of a dispute. When this is so, an advocate
must inquire further into the implications of providing service for a
litigant.
A. Calculating Advantages
The second question of accountability hinges, at least in part,
on a value-neutral assessment of outcomes that is a routine aspect
of advocate-client relations. Advocates regularly counsel clients,
for instance, concerning the likelihood of success of their claims.
41
Plea bargaining proceeds on the basis of calculations of advan-
tages,42 as do settlement negotiations.43 If there were no doubt
41 An advocate acts as an adviser when he offers his opinion concerning the likelihood
of a successful outcome for a claim. See, e.g., MODEL CODE EC 7-5: "A lawyer as adviser
furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes
would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand .... "
42 See, e.g., Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652 (1981):
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about the reliability of these calculations, the second question could
be quickly disposed of, and what most advocates ask in only a value-
neutral sense could provide the basis for further inquiry into the
justifiability of seeking a given result.
The tactical version of the perspectival objection serves as a
reminder, though, that what, in everyday law practice, is only a mat-
ter of educated guesswork is itself open to question. This objec-
tion, it might be suggested, can best be framed as an extension of
skeptical doubts the legal realists raised two generations ago about
the accuracy of rule-based predictions of legal results. For the real-
ists, predictability itself was not necessarily in doubt. Many of
them, such as Karl Llewellyn, cited what have here been called "in-
formal" advantages to supplement what they believed to be defi-
ciencies in the predictive value of formal rules of law.4 4 By
considering these informal factors in conjunction with formal ones
an advocate, according to Llewellyn, can achieve reasonable relia-
bility of prediction.45 It is in this sense that a more profound skep-
ticism is required if the entire enterprise of calculating advantages
is to be called into question, for one would have to ask whether the
facts relevant to the calculation of any kind of advantage can ever
be determined with sufficient accuracy to generate reliable conclu-
sions concerning the achievement of desired results. This deep
skepticism can serve as the basis for a challenge to the reliability of
any answer to the second question of accountability.
Before considering an argument for the accuracy of at least
some calculations of advantages, it would be wise to point out that
uncertainty about advantages casts doubt on only one element
"Criminal defendants today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers primarily because they
perceive that this action is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would follow con-
viction at trial." See also Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay? Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole
Processes, 1 J. CRIM. JUsT. 27, 32 (1973) (statistics presented show that the average sentence
for defendants charged with robbery in New York County in 1968 to 1969 was 3.9 years
following guilty plea and 8.2 years following trial).
43 See e.g., Sindell & Sindell, Formulae to Evaluate Injury Cases, in SETrLEMENT AND PLEA
BARGAINING (M. Edwards & K. Meyer ed. 1981) (Settlement Value = Probable Jury Ver-
dict/1O0 X Case Point Value (with case point value determined by considering various
formal and informal advantages, such as the defendant's liability and the characteristics of
the plaintiff and defendant involved in the case)).
44 There is, Llewellyn remarked, "less possibility of accurate prediction than the tradi-
tional [i.e. formal] rules would lead us to believe." Llewelllyn, Some Realism about Realism:
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1241 (1931).
45 Llewellyn offered the following summary of his later position:
The fact is that the work of our appellate courts all over the country is reckonable
. . . on an absolute scale, quite sufficient for skilled craftsmen to make usable and
valuable judgments about likelihoods . . . . [There is] a way of reckoning the
forthcoming results which is not only that used by the ablest and most successful
appellate and drafting counsel, but is also available to any lawyer of ordinary
intelligence.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION: DECIDING APPEALs 4, 6 (1960).
1985]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
among the considerations bearing upon refusal. Uncertainty does
not make refusal itself unacceptable. Two concessions can thus be
made without jeopardizing the argument for conscientious refusal,
even when deep skepticism prevails concerning the calculability of
advantages. One is that uncertainty about the strength of advan-
tages is common with respect to many claims. Rule-skepticism (the
branch of realism developed by Karl Llewellyn, among others46) is
often warranted, for instance, when a novel legal issue is raised or
when well-established legal rights conflict. Fact-skepticism, the ver-
sion of realism championed by Jerome Frank,47 can be warranted
when the facts of a dispute are closely controverted or, even when
they are not, on a matter concerning which community sentiment is
in flux and over which ajury can have the final say. Second, it must
also be conceded that uncertainty concerning an outcome can serve
as a reason for claim-advancement above and beyond the value of
providing access. As long as the legal system in which an advocate
works produces justifiable results more often than not, there will
then be a good reason, in the absence of reliable predictions as to
the outcome, to seek a questionable result (i.e. a result whose moral
justifiability is uncertain) and so to defer to the judgment of the
arbiter charged with passing on it.
However, important as this deference principle (as it might be
called) can be, it still cannot be considered strong enough, even
when considered in conjunction with the values realized by provid-
ing access, to warrant rejection of conscientious refusal in all situa-
tions where uncertainty exists about the likelihood of reaching a
result. Concededly, the deference principle should sometimes be
used to resolve doubts in favor of service. In particular, it should
be used when an advocate is uncertain about the likelihood of a
result and uncertain about its justifiability, for then the fact that the
legal system produces justifiable results more often than not ought
to tip the scales in favor of providing service.
Two variations illustrate, though, why the deference principle
cannot always be decisive when there is uncertainty about the likeli-
hood of a result. In one variation, uncertainty about likelihood
could be accompanied by a strong conviction that achieving a result
46 For an analysis of realism in terms of the distinction (first proposed by Jerome Frank)
between rule- and fact-skepticism, see W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM,
REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Chaps. 2 & 3 (1968).
47 Frank summarized his approach to fact-skepticism in the following way:
What is the Fact? Is it what actually happened between Sensible and Smart? Most
emphatically not. At best, it is only what the trial court-the trial judge orjury-
thinks what happened. What the trial court thinks happened may, however, be
hopelessly incorrect. But that does not matter-legally speaking. For court pur-
poses, what the court thinks about the facts is all that matters.
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 15 (1949).
[Vol. 61:36
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
would be unjustifiable, thus requiring an advocate to balance the
value of providing access against the negative value of taking an
uncertain risk of harm to others. In the other variation, uncertainty
could surround calculation of the likelihood of a specific result, but
an advocate could determine that whatever the legal system's pat-
tern of dispositions in general, its pattern for the type of result at
stake is more often unjustifiable than justifiable. If this were so, an
anti-deference principle would apply. In either case, an uncertain
answer about the chances of a claim's success would not necessarily
provide a conclusive reason against conscientious refusal, even
when considered in conjunction with the benefits of providing ac-
cess. On the contrary, while uncertainty can yield to a deference
principle, it need not always do so.
In any event, one would concede too much by allowing for in-
variable uncertainty in the calculation of advantages, for while
doubts must arise with respect to novel claims or for those in which
the facts are closely controverted, other kinds of claims are suffi-
ciently routine to make reliable prediction possible. A brief inven-
tory of calculable advantages is provided below. Before turning to
it, though, some general points about the calculation of advantages
and conscientious refusal should be noted. The first is that empiri-
cal studies prompted by the realists have confirmed the qualified
skepticism they have adopted, but have not provided support for a
deeper skepticism that casts doubt on the reliability of all predic-
tions of outcomes.48 In this context, one must distinguish between
routine claims for which formal and informal advantages, when
considered separately or in conjunction, can serve as reliable
predictors and nonroutine ones which require greater caution.
Jurimetric studies of the United States Supreme Court have allowed
for the possibility of some predictability even for the generally
nonroutine cases heard by that court.49 The kind of routine trial
48 An indication of the continuity between the programmatic statements of the realists
and the conclusions reached by later generations of empirical researchers may be found in
the penultimate chapter of the Kalven-Zeisel study of the American jury. The authors cite
Herman Oliphant's skeptical suggestion, first advanced in 1928, that while formal rules of
law may not, by themselves, offer a sound basis for prediction, a science of law can nonethe-
less be developed by fusing a concern with formal rules with what Oliphant called "non-
vocal" judicial behavior. "The predictive element" in the legal process, Oliphant argued,
"is what the courts have done in response to stimuli of the facts of concrete cases before
them. Note not the judges' opinions but which way they decide cases, will be the dominant
subject matter of any truly scientific study of law." "Our study of the jury," Kalven and
Zeisel conclude, "emphasizes the non-vocal behavior ofjuries. At least with respect to the
decisions ofjuries, we are inclined to think that this early view [i.e., Oliphant's] is correct."
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 490-91 (1966).
49 See, e.g., Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the
"Right to Counsel" Cases, 51 AM. POL. Sc. RE V. 1 (1957); Nagel, Predicting Court Cases Quantita-
tively, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1411 (1965).
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and appellate cases that provide most of the candidates for consci-
entious refusal allow for even greater predictability of result.50 In
fact, the considerations advocates usually take into account in calcu-
lating advantages-formal rules such as evidentiary privileges and
jurisdictional regulations and informal ones such as known arbiter
attitudes-have been cited by students of the trial process as key
determinants of results achieved. 51
Second, it should also be borne in mind that the perspectival
difficulties advocates encounter are usually less severe when advan-
tages must be calculated than when other facts of a case need to be
discovered. This is because, in most instances, advantages do not
arise by surprise but instead can be determined via preliminary in-
terviews and research. The question of a defendant's guilt might,
for instance, require access to facts the defendant would be unwill-
ing to provide even his lawyer, while the legal advantages accruing
from an improper search or interrogation could well be determined
on the basis of information a defendant would gladly provide. Is-
sues such as the applicability of a statute of limitations or the need
to join an indispensable party can also be determined through in-
terviews and research, thus reducing the perspectival difficulties
that underlie the tactical objection.
The inventory of advantages provided below reviews those that
can arise in the course of advancing routine claims and that can be
calculated at a time when it is professionally permissible to refuse
service. For the sake of convenience, the inventory (which does not
pretend to be exhaustive) covers formal and informal advantages
separately, although in many instances the combined effect of these
advantages must be considered in determining the likelihood of
reaching a litigant's desired result. Also, within each category, dis-
cussion begins with the strongest kinds of advantages, which can be
said to provide paradigm situations for conscientious refusal, and
moves from these to advantages that are strong, though rarely
decisive.
50 For a discussion of the predictability of the outcomes of relatively routine appellate
cases, see Kort, Content Analysis ofJudicial Opinions and Rules, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G. Shu-
bert ed. 1963) (showing significant degree of predictive value when the 38 workmen's com-
pensation cases decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court between 1927 and 1938 were
used to predict the next 38 cases to be decided by the same court).
51 In their study of the American jury, for instanie, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that
the evidentiary privilege most likely to aid criminal defendants is the one forbidding disclo-
sure of a defendant's criminal record. Other formal rules that can influence criminal trial
outcomes are juror ignorance of the fact that a guilty plea has been withdrawn, that a blood
test was refused or suppressed, and that other charges were pending. KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 48, at 131. Kalven and Zeisel also offer an inventory of factors that can provide
informal advantages for criminal defendants. While their detailed list is a lengthy one, they
group possible informal advantages under three headings: disparity of counsel, jury senti-




The unifying feature of the strongest formal advantages is that
they enable advocates to determine in advance the necessary and
sufficient conditions for reaching a litigant's desired goal. If an ad-
vocate knows through interviews and preliminary research that
these conditions can be satisfied, then the legal system can serve as
a highly reliable means to a desired end.
a. Side Effects of Claim-Advancement
The result a litigant seeks does not have to be the final disposi-
tion of a claim; instead it can be a side effect brought about by an
advocate's exercise of his discretionary power to initiate a claim.
Under the rules of professional responsibility, an advocate may ad-
vance a claim as long as there is a legally reasonable basis for doing
so.52 Furthermore, the rules do not prohibit claim-advancement
even if one of its foreseeable side effects will be to deplete the re-
sources of an opponent with a justifiable case, or to delay an event,
or to achieve publicity for a cause.53 Arbiters in turn possess only
limited power to prevent advocates from exploiting opportunities
to initiate suits and motions. 54 In all likelihood, little harm is in-
tended or accomplished on many occasions when these opportuni-
ties are used. There can certainly be some occasions, though, when
52 See MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(1):
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not file a suit, assert a position,
conduct a defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of a client when he
knows or where it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or mali-
ciously injure another.
(emphasis added). See also MODEL RuLEs 3.1: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a pro-
ceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a reasonable basis for doing
so, which includes a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing
law."
53 Some jurisdictions impose restrictions beyond those contained in professional codes
on attorneys' power to initiate suits or motions. An example of a recent attempt to impose
relatively strong limitations on attorneys can be found in the 1983 revision of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The new rule states that an attorney must certify, first,
that a pleading or motion "is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for its extension" and second, that the pleading or motion "is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation." FED. R. Crv. P. 11. Even this modified rule,
however, would not prohibit an attorney from initiating a suit or a motion likely to bring
about the side effects mentioned in the text.
54 In amending Rule 11 (see note 53 supra), the Advisory Committee for the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure conceded that "experience has shown that in practice the Rule has
not been effective in deterring [litigation] abuses." In order to combat these, the new rule
not only prohibits harassment and so on, it also authorizes courts to sanction attorneys and
parties engaging in the prohibited practices. Two difficulties remain, however. First, as
indicated at text and note 53 supra, many morally problematic practices continue to lie
within Rule I l's range of acceptable behavior. Second, even when conduct is defined as
legally unacceptable, the opportunities for judicial detection of it are limited given the pre-
texts available to attorneys and litigants when initiating suits and motions.
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side effects loom large. Given the often passive role of arbiters in
this context, advocate power to take the initiative with respect to
suits and motions can thus become a matter of critical importance.
b. Final Dispositions
In situations involving final dispositions, decisive formal ad-
vantages are usually preclusive in nature: that is, an advocate can
know prior to providing service that, given the law of the jurisdic-
tion, the court will have to accord priority to some issues that can
guarantee a favorable disposition over other issues that could lead
to an unfavorable disposition. The fourth amendment exclusionary
rule provides an example of this, since arbiters review questions of
police misconduct in pretrial hearings before reaching the question
of a defendant's guilt.5 5 Eviction statutes often use the same ap-
proach, with the issue of nonpayment of rent receiving attention
apart from a landlord's maintenance of an apartment.56 Numerous
procedural rules and jurisdictional requirements have the same ef-
fect since they too are grounded in preclusions which prohibit arbi-
ters from considering factors morally relevant, yet damaging, to a
claim.5
7
Criminal and civil defendants and civil plaintiffs can avail them-
selves of decisive formal advantages, although they are more fre-
quently used by both kinds of defendants than by civil plaintiffs.
Defendants most commonly exploit these advantages via motions
to dismiss-for lack of evidence (as when the exclusionary rule is
applied in a case involving a possessory offense), 58 or for lack of
jurisdiction (as when a court lacks the power to rule on the subject
matter of a suit).59
55 Under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), state courts are constitutionally pro-
hibited from considering evidence police have gathered in violation of a defendant's fourth
amendment rights.
56 A statute that has received considerable attention in this context is the Oregon Forci-
ble Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.105-160 (1984), which was
upheld against due process and equal protection challenges in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972).
57 Procedural rules having this effect include (1) those that imply waiver when, because
of inadvertence, a timely objection was not made to a court ruling, (2) evidentiary privileges
that bar courts from hearing probative evidence, and (3) rules that prohibit splitting of
causes of action and thus prevent parties with just claims from recovering if such claims
were not included in the initial suit. Jurisdictional rules having this effect include (1) those
that prohibit a court from proceeding with a claim because of a defect in service of process,
(2) those in the federal courts requiring compete diversity of citizenship between parties (a
particularly harsh rule if a state forum is unavailable), and (3) those that require a plaintiff
to relitigate a money judgment in a state court where a defendant's property is located after
winning a judgment in another state's court.
58 See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (conviction for heroin possession
reversed because the officer had not engaged in a reasonable search for the heroin).
59 Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, requires dismis-
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Two mutually reinforcing devices are needed for a plaintiff to
be certain of success: favorable substantive law (the necessary and
sufficient conditions for which the plaintiff's advocate must be cer-
tain of satisfying) and a device for overriding a jury verdict if the
defendant were to possess and choose to exercise a right to a jury
trial and if ajury were to find for the defendant despite the strength
of the evidence against him. Civil plaintiffs can, at least on some
occasions, meet both conditions. Landlord-tenant laws, for in-
stance, often allow for summary eviction procedures and are but-
tressed by devices, such as the motion for a directed verdict and the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which limit the
power of civil juries to exercise their preferences in opposition to
the law.60 As a criminal plaintiff, the state can sometimes satisfy the
first of these conditions but, because of the criminal jury's power to
nullify the law, never the second.6' Criminal plaintiffs can thus en-
joy strong formal (and informal) advantages, but never decisive
ones.
This said, the possibility of decisive formal advantages is clear
enough. Whenever they are encountered, the advocate's world is
turned upside down, for advocates enjoy unconstrained authority in
deciding whether to initiate such claims and, in doing so, can be
certain that arbiters will be constrained to grant their claims.
Under these circumstances, an advocate, while still employing the
precatory language characteristic of his profession, will stand out as
the decisive figure in bringing about a final legal result.
Decisive formal advantages are significant not only in them-
selves, but also because they provide a benchmark for considering
the far commoner advantages that are strong but not decisive.
Many of these less than decisive advantages are also preclusive in
nature, since they effectively foreclose arbiter attention to issues
morally relevant yet damaging to a claim. Thus, if an advocate
knows he is likely to succeed in a motion to exclude a murder con-
fession obtained under a slight variation of the Miranda warnings,
he would also know that if other evidence of guilt exists, a motion
sal of a claim at any time prior to final appellatejudgment if the court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim.
60 Thus, to use the example already cited at note 56 supra, if a tenant-defendant were to
insist on ajury trial, as permitted by OR. REV. STAT. § 105.150 (1984), an advocate for the
landlord-plaintiff could still determine, on the basis of the limited range of issues that may
be considered in a summary eviction proceeding, that the defendant would be unable to
meet the requirements set by the statute. See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.125(1) (1984). Even if
the defendant prevailed with the jury, the landlord could nonetheless prevail on the law by
making a motion for a directed verdict and, following the jury verdict, moving for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict.
61 For a discussion of the criminal jury's legal power to nullify the law, see M. & S.
KADISH, DIsCRETION TO DIsOBEY 45-66 (1973).
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to dismiss might not succeed, but the chance of either success on
such a motion or of an acquittal would at least be significantly
enhanced. 62
Other variations on decisive formal advantages are different in
nature since they do not involve foreclosing arbiter attention to is-
sues but instead involve prescriptions of the weightings arbiters
must apply in evaluating a claim. A weighting is inescapable when-
ever an arbiter is directed to apply a burden of proof.63 Advocates
in turn must consider the likely impact of a burden of proof when
defending clients whose wrongdoing, although a matter of certainty
for them, is not necessarily demonstrable given the relevant rules of
evidence and the burden placed on the opposing party. Substan-
tive law contains weightings as well since it provides directions for
arbiters as to the relative value to accord competing goods. In con-
stitutional law, for instance, the Supreme Court has given priority
to property interests over interests in decent shelter;6 local control
over education has been accorded greater value than equal funding
of school districts; 65 and state discretion in devising welfare
schemes has received higher priority than equal funding for chil-
dren protected by such schemes. 66 In tort law, property interests
can be accorded priority over the interests of trespassers in their
62 This does not mean a defendant will always prevail once a confession is excluded. In
widely-publicized cases, for instance, the state has often pressed successfully for a convic-
tion on retrial following a Supreme Court determination that a confession was improperly
admitted at trial. Thus, following the Supreme Court's exclusion of his confession, Ernest
Miranda was convicted again of rape and kidnapping. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969). On the other hand, the
defendants whose confessions were excluded in the Supreme Court's first two applications
of Miranda appear to have benefitted from their appellate victories. No appellate report can
be found for the retrials of Robert Mathis and Reyes Orozco, indicating that each may have
been able to plead to a lesser offense than the one originally charged. See Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
63 Wigmore, for instance, analyzes the burden of proof in terms of the risk of nonper-
suasion it places on one of the parties in a suit. See 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (Chad-
bourne rev. 1981). It may be desirable as a matter of policy to create such risks for certain
types of litigation. This does not mean, though, that lawyers should always exploit the
advantages created by assignment of the risks to the opposition. The legitimacy of exploit-
ing these advantages is particularly worth considering when an advocate represents some-
one who will probably engage again in harmful conduct. Such questions can arise when the
evidence is weak with respect to landlords charged with harassment, individuals charged
with drunk driving, thieves with long arrest records for the crime they allegedly committed,
and so on.
64 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (upholding the summary eviction proce-
dures of the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute against equal protection
and due process challenges based on the argument that the Constitution establishes a fun-
damental interest in decent shelter and possession of one's home).
65 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting an
equal protection challenge to interdistrict inequalities in a Texas school financing scheme).
66 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (rejecting an equal protection chal-
lenge to a Maryland Aid to Families with Dependent Children program that imposed a
maximum grant of $250 per month per family regardless of family size or need).
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bodily security;6 7 under the Uniform Commercial Code, a holder in
due course can take priority over the victim of a fraud;68 and so on.
Value weightings of this kind influence outcomes; only on some oc-
casions are they strong enough to be decisive by themselves. Even
this influence can be significant, however, given advocate freedom
to advance claims accompanied by such advantages and the fore-
seeability of constraints on arbiters if the claims are advanced.
2. Informal Advantages
In contrast to formal advantages, informal ones can never be
so powerfully arrayed as to warrant certainty that an advocate will
obtain his client's desired result. This is attributable partly to the
fact that informal advantages depend not on arbiter fidelity to legal
obligations, but instead on arbiters' known proclivity to exercise
discretion in a certain way. Lower reliability is attributable as well,
though, to the fact that these advantages usually arise in the context
of reviewable discretion, in which case a higher court can reject the
discretionary decision made by the arbiter (whether judge or jury)
in a lower court. There are numerous instances, though, in which
the exercise of discretion is at least relatively predictable and in
which higher court review of its exercise is either forbidden or
unlikely.
a. Side Effects of Claim-Advancement
While formal advantages are more important for a side effects
strategy than informal ones, occasions do arise when informal ad-
vantages can supplement a strategy based primarily on formal ones.
Thus, while parties usually are able to initiate motions as of right,
leave to renew a motion-and so further delay an event-will de-
pend on the discretion of a court,69 in which case a judge's known
preferences concerning motion renewal can loom large. Similar
points apply to the scope of pre-trial discovery, 70 where a judge's
67 See, e.g., Smith v. Delery, 238 La. 180, 114 So. 2d 857 (1959) (after giving warning
but before waiting for retreat, homeowner was entitled to fire a shot at a newsboy who had
entered homeowner's bushes to retrieve a dog that accompanied the newsboy on his route).
68 The Uniform Commerical Code states that the victim of a fraud can prevail only if he
had no reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of the contents of the fraudulent in-
strument. See U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c) comment 7 (1964). Comment 7 is cited with approval in
Burchett v.-Allied-Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964) (defendant
was tricked into signing a document different from the one he had read; plaintiff prevailed).
69 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (vesting judges with discretion to relieve parties
from orders already entered in the course of a trial).
70 The scope of discovery is usually left to the discretion of the trial judge. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (establishing criteria for the exercise of discovery). The limiting terms
contained in these criteria---"unreasonably cumulative and duplicative" and "unduly bur-
densome"-are evaluative in nature, and advocates will often be able to determine, on the
basis of a trial judge's past performance, how he will apply them in a particular case.
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preferences can be critical to successful furtherance of a side-effects
strategy. In neither instance would a higher court be likely to re-
view a trial judge's discretionary decision concerning these
matters.71
b. Final Dispositions
In situations where informal advantages are particularly
strong, advocates present claims to arbiters who have unreviewable
discretion and who are known to be favorably disposed to the
causes advanced. This can occur before initiation of the adversary
process, as when an advocate knows he has a good chance of per-
suading a prosecutor or an investigator in an administrative agency
not to proceed with a case.72 It can also occur within the adversary
process itself, as when a criminal defense attorney knows that, be-
cause of community sentiment, he might well be able to persuade a
jury to nullify the law and find for his client.73 Two variations on
this, which occur more frequently, should be considered as well. In
one, arbiters can exercise their preferences because the highest
court of the jurisdiction has authority to resolve disputed questions
of law.74 It is the fact of finality that creates some similarity be-
tween this and jury nullification;75 differences arise because the
range in which preferences are exercised is usually narrower at the
appellate than at the juror level. The second variation offers the
71 This is because most jurisdictions follow a final judgment rule-and so rarely allow
interlocutory appeals of matters such as pre-trial discovery. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir.
1967), contains an inventory of the reasons courts cite in strongly disfavoring interlocutory
appeals of discovery orders.
72 The discretion of prosecutors and officers of administrative agencies not to proceed
with a case is discussed critically in K. DAVIS, DIsCRETIONARYJUSnCE 162-214 (1969).
73 In their sample of 3,567 trials, Kalven and Zeisel found that the jury was more leni-
ent than the judge with respect to final disposition in 920 instances, or about 26%o of the
time. Within these 920 instances, juror sentiment about the law accounts for about one-
fourth to one-third of the disagreements. Laws particularly likely to provoke juror nullifica-
tion include those dealing with gaming, liquor, and gambling. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra
note 48, at 109-115, 286-97.
74 A dramatic example of this power of finality can be found in a decision of the South
Dakota Supreme Court, following a remand from the United States Supreme Court, that
the warrantless inventory search of an illegally parked car violates the South Dakota Consti-
tution. The sequence of decisions in South Dakota v. Opperman is as follows: (1) 89 S.D.
25, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975) (holding by South Dakota Supreme Court that such a search
violates the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution); (2) 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(holding that such a search does not violate the fourth amendment); and (3) 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976) (holding that such a search violates article VI, section II of the South Da-
kota Constitution).
75 Justice Robert Jackson offered the following comment concerning the finality of the
United States Supreme Court: "There is no doubt that if there were a super Supreme
Court, a substantial portion of our reversals of state courts would be reversed. We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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most frequently encountered instances of exploitable informal ad-
vantages. Here, an arbiter's preferences are predictable (as was
true before), while his exercise of discretion, although reviewable,
will likely receive deference on appeal. Instances of this include ju-
ror attitudes that can be exploited by prosecutors, 76 preferences of
sentencing judges on which either prosecutors or defense attorneys
can capitalize, 77 preferences of members of intermediate panels
when these panels are authorized to affirm trial judgments without
opinion, 78 and the preferences of officials of administrative agen-
cies when they exercise their power to determine facts or make
technical judgments about the feasibility of a project.7
9
76 "Pro-prosecutor equities," as Kalven and Zeisel call them, can involve certain kinds
of crimes (sex crimes, for instance) and certain kinds of defendant-complaining witness
pairings (black defendants v. white female complaining witnesses, for instance). See KALVEN
& ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 395-410.
77 Numerous researchers have found consistency within a judge's sentencing decisions
but disparity between the decisions of judges serving in the same jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Gaudet, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G.
Shubert ed. 1963) (individual consistency among six New Jersey judges over ten-year pe-
riod but wide disparity between them in treating similar crimes); Nagel,Judicial Bacgrounds
and Criminal Cases, 53J. GRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 333 (1962) (50%o difference for black as
opposed to white defendants convicted of similar crimes even when prior records of de-
fendants are held constant); Cargan & Coates, The Indeterminate Sentence and Judicial Bias, 20
CRIME & DELINQ. 144 (1974) (for defendants convicted of robbery, more than a 200% dif-
ference in imprisonment rates among judges within a single jurisdiction).
78 For example, the circuit courts may affirm judgments without opinion, an option
they exercise with considerable frequency, as can be discerned by consulting any volume of
the second series of the Federal Reporter. See FED. R. App. P. 36. This power can be, and
sometimes is, used to dispose of convictions which, if confronted directly, would pose diffi-
cult questions about the legal propriety of a trial judge's determinations of law. There may
well be occasions when prosecutors should capitalize on this discretionary "black hole" in
the criminal justice system. However, given the advantage this creates for them, they must
devote special attention to the justifiability of what they seek.
79 An exposition of the standards to be employed in according deference to the actions
of administrative agencies can be found in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657
F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In certain instances more than deference is required. For
example, courts do not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Veteran's Adminis-
tration concerning benefits for veterans and their dependents and survivors. 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1982). This rule has been criticized because of the burden it places on those
unfairly denied their claims. See Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional
Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. LJ. 183 (1964) (absence of judicial review as al-
lowing administrators to deny benefits for improper reasons); Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial
Review in the Processing of Claims for Veteran's Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STN. L. REV.
905 (1975) (loyalties within a bureaucratic system as creating opportunities for arbitrariness
that can be checked only byjudicial review). Even if the majority of the decisions made by a
given agency are proper, advocates for the government are still placed in a position where
they, rather than the courts, have a decisive voice concerning the justifiability of specific
claims. In situations such as these, advocates are arbiters by default in claims against the
government. This does not mean they will assume the perspective of arbiters; but if they do
not, it is certain no one else will.
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B. Determining Moral Justifiability
As was noted in the course of reviewing advantages, whenever
the first two questions of accountability yield positive answers, then
advocates rather than arbiters stand out as the decisive figures in
the adversary process. Role-expectations are reversed in these situ-
ations, requiring advocates to modify their attitudes toward claim-
advancement. Thus, while the calculation of advantages requires
an instrumental approach to advocacy, a broader approach that
takes into account intrinsic moral values is needed once it is clear
that arbiters cannot be expected to act on such values on their own.
Even in situations where effective arbiter screening is unlikely,
conscientious refusal remains open to two final perspectival objec-
tions. First, it can be argued that the facts bearing on the justifiabil-
ity of a result are more difficult to determine than those relevant to
the calculation of advantages. Second, it can also be argued that
because arbiters enjoy a broader perspective than do advocates, the
latter should not attempt to assess the justifiability of results sought
but instead should defer to arbiters even under the imperfect con-
ditions that prevail when a questionable claim is strongly ad-
vantaged. Access values, it could be pointed out, are always
sacrificed because of conscientious refusal; furthermore, access val-
ues are sacrificed on the basis of a limited perspective that makes
suspect advocates' moral judgments of the justifiability of the re-
sults that might be achieved.
These final objections should be treated as conclusive argu-
ments against refusal, though, only if in the subset of claims at stake it
is more likely that worse results will flow from advocates' exercise
of moral judgment than from no exercise of moral judgment at all.
Because we are concerned with questionable, strongly advantaged
claims, one can concede that arbiter exercise of moral judgment is
generally preferable to its exercise by advocates without conceding
that advocates should not exercise such judgment in the special
kinds of situations at stake here. Thus,. when arbiters have an op-
portunity to become acquainted with the facts surrounding a claim
and can be relied on to assess the claim without moral bias, it is
preferable for advocates to defer to their judgment of the issues
raised. When strong advantages are present, though, at least one
of these deference-creating factors will be missing, and advocates
must then choose between advancing a claim when effective arbiter
moral judgment is unlikely and exercising judgment about a claim
on their own.
When framed in this way, it seems wiser to treat perspectival
objections relevant to the determination of justifiability as caution-
ary warnings about the fallibility of moral judgment, not as insuper-
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able objections to its exercise by advocates. Consider first the
problems surrounding discovery of the facts relevant to the justifia-
bility of a claim. In normal circumstances, arbiters can discover
these better than advocates. Here, the reverse is the case, although
it is better to characterize advocates' positions as a least-worst,
rather than a strong, one. That is,in this context, arbiters are often
prohibited from considering information morally relevant yet dam-
aging to a result, while advocates can consider this information and
can take the initiative on their own to discover other facts bearing
on justifiability. Even with further inquiry, an advocate could well
be uncertain about justifiability because of a scarcity of information
in a specific situation. However, only a chronic scarcity in all in-
stances would warrant a prohibition of advocate inquiry into justifi-
ability. The better approach is to caution advocates to resolve
doubts in favor of service but to allow for refusal in situations
where arbiters cannot be expected to act on information advocates
reliably possess.
A similar approach can be taken to moral assessment itself.
One can thus concede not only that mistakes in advocate judgment
are possible, but also that moral judgments are open to a broader
range of objections than are factual ones. The question to be
asked, though, is whether these reasons establish a rebuttable or
conclusive presumption in favor of service. If a conclusive pre-
sumption is established, then situations will arise in which neither
advocates nor arbiters will meaningfully scrutinize the results
sought. If a rebuttable presumption is established, the problem to
be confronted involves advocate moral fallibility. Two factors,
however, make it unlikely that litigants seeking justifiable results
will be denied access to the adversary process. One is the doubt-
resolving procedure just mentioned. As long as advocates treat the
existence of substantial doubt concerning the justifiability of a re-
sult as a reason to seek it, few litigants will be mistakenly denied
representation on this ground. Assuming some are nonetheless de-
nied service, the size and decentralization of the market for advo-
cate services provides a second safeguard. Even if one advocate
refuses representation for a result falling within the range of sub-
stantial doubt, it is unlikely all others would do the same. Heavy-
handedness by advocates would hardly seem to be a danger given
these safeguards. In fact, since advocates may tend, because of the
pressure of market forces, to adopt a lowest-common denominator
view ofjustifiability, it is important to encourage advocates to real-
ize that in these situations they must make the principled assess-
ments arbiters cannot be expected to make. Assuming this
encouragement is offered with the requisite caution, clearly objec-
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tionable results will then be identified while those whose justifiabil-
ity is uncertain will receive the benefit of the doubt.
If determination of the justifiability of a result requires advo-
cate assumption of an arbiter's perspective, the final question to be
asked-concerning the justifiability of actually providing service-
involves an incorporation of that perspective into the one tradition-
ally associated with advocacy. If a result is clearly unjustifiable and
likely to be achieved, only in unusual circumstances can one then
discover countervailing considerations of sufficient strength to war-
rant pursuing the result. Two such circumstances deserve atten-
tion. First, the risk of producing an unjustifiable result can be
strong but not decisively so, in which case emphasis might be given
to access in the hope that effective screening will occur. And sec-
ond, the strength of access values can vary. In some situations-
when a cause becomes particularly notorious, for instance-vindi-
cation of the principle of access can become so important that it
outweighs the negative value of contributing to the risk of unjustifi-
able harm. The two exceptions are not mutually exclusive. If, how-
ever, neither is appropriate, then conscientious refusal must be the
preferred course of action.
As has been suggested, conscientious refusal need not involve
complete refusal of service. On the contrary, given the counter-
vailing significance of access values, the scope of refusal should be
limited to what is necessary to avoid a significant risk of unjustifi-
able harm. In some situations, the advantages surrounding a claim
may make complete refusal necessary. In other situations, though,
full refusal need only serve as an option of last resort in order to
gain a litigant's consent not to press an objectionable advantage.
Thus, if a litigant indicates a willingness to consider qualified ac-
cess, an advocate might propose any of the following as alternatives
to complete refusal: waiver of an advantage if a case actually goes
to trial, avoidance of a side-effects strategy prior to trial or during
one, or development of a justifiable offer for a settlement or a plea
(thus making exploitation of an objectionable advantage unneces-
sary). If the litigant accepts one or more of these proposals, his
lawyer would, by providing qualified access, make possible the par-
tial realization of access values and would at the same time safe-
guard against use of the adversary process to reach unjustifiable
results.
In spite of the attractiveness of qualified access, some lawyers
might argue for avoiding it on principle because it involves an un-
fair exercise of advocate power vis-a-vis the lay public. The point is
important and can actually be stated in two different ways: that this
kind of bargaining is improper in itself and that, even if proper,
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qualified access is illegitimate for indigent litigants given their lim-
ited options in seeking representation.
As far as the first version of this objection is concerned, it is
hard to see why bargaining should be rejected as a matter of princi-
ple. Bargaining over the terms of representation would be im-
proper if full refusal were improper as well. However, while
litigants have a morally significant interest in obtaining access to
the adversary process, this does not mean they have a moral right to
use advocates to achieve wrongful ends. Assuming an advocate can
justifiably refuse service altogether in a given situation, no reason
exists for him not to "bargain" by offering qualified service as an
alternative to full refusal. The bargaining at stake involves no more
than a statement that the advocate will provide service if a litigant
modifies the objectives he has set for his case. The litigant may
resist the proposed modifications, but an advocate is under no obli-
gation to revise his own position because of a litigant's determina-
tion to reach a wrongful result.
Whether advocates can legitimately offer qualified access to lit-
igants with limited prospects for finding other lawyers is another
matter. If replicating the bargaining power of prosperous litigants
were of critical importance, then refusal of those with less leverage
would be open to serious challenge. To argue in this way, though,
would be to treat equality as more important than harm-avoid-
ance-to suggest, in other words, that because the prosperous are
more often able to use the legal system to reach wrongful results
than the indigent, the latter should be put on the same footing as
the former. Equality is a more specific and limited good than this,
one that assumes priority in moral reasoning only when what is to
be distributed is itself worthwhile. An argument from equality can
carry no weight, then, when opportunities to harm others are at
stake.
C. Blanket Justifications for Advocacy
One further objection to the thesis presented here remains.
According to the article's argument, advocates are accountable for
the service they willingly provide and must be prepared to offer jus-
tifications on a case-by-case basis for the balance they strike be-
tween access and its undesirable consequences. The point is
certainly appealing, but a critic of conscientious refusal might note
that the argument presented so far begs an important question con-
ceming the value of providing access. In the comments on consci-
entious refusal, the critic could note, it was taken for granted that
only a rebuttable presumption can be established in favor of ac-
cess-taken for granted, in other words, that the tension between
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providing access and avoiding harm must sometimes be resolved
against access. To the critic, though, access might well have a
higher value than has been suggested so far. The critic might, for
instance, offer a blanket justification for advocacy per se. That is,
he might cite any one of a number of possible arguments which
hold that it is always morally preferable to provide zealous service
than to qualify its provision or to deny it altogether.8 0 Alterna-
tively, the critic might advance a blanket justification limited to one
of the specialities within the law; in particular, he might cite one of
the many arguments advanced to justify the invariable provision of
zealous service for criminal defendants.8 1 Neither approach, how-
ever, proves to be convincing when examined carefully. Nonethe-
less, blanket justifications for advocacy in general do constitute a
last line of defense against conscientious refusal in all situations
and so merit attention on that ground alone. Furthermore, because
of the importance that representaton of criminal defendants has in
discussions of the ethics of advocacy, there are strong reasons for
examining blanket justifications which are confined to that spe-
cialty. This subsection is thus devoted to justifications for advocacy
in general, and the concluding subsection to justifications for repre-
senting criminal defendants.
The first justification for advocacy in general deals with the
value of realizing legal rights, for it could be argued that vindica-
tion of the expectations engendered by legal rights always out-
80 Lord Brougham argued, for example, that it is justifiable for an advocate to use "all
means and expedients" in promoting his client's interests:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and
at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the tor-
ments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though
it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821). See also Thode, The Ethical Standard
for the Advocate, 39 TFx. L. REv. 575, 580-86 (1961) (while advocates should, as citizens, seek
modification of unjust laws, their sole duty when representing clients is to maximize, within
the bounds set by law, the advantages available to their clients).
81 Monroe Freedman has, for instance, offered the following justification for criminal
defense advocacy:
Are there no limits (short of violating criminal law and rules of court) to the parti-
san zeal that an attorney should exert on behalf of a client who may be a murderer,
a rapist, a drug pusher, or a despoiler of the environment? Is the lawyer never to
make a conscientious judgment about the impact of a client's conduct on the pub-
lic interest and to temper the zealousness of his or her representation accordingly?
I believe that the adversary system is itself in the highest public interest. . . and
that it is, therefore, inconsistent with the public interest to direct lawyers to be less
than zealous in their roles as partisan advocates in the adversary system.
Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers'Advocacy?, 2J. LEGAL PROF. 47 (1977).




weighs the negative value of creating a significant risk of an
unjustifiable result. In order to defend this claim, however, one
would have to defend the further proposition that lawmakers (legis-
lators, judges, delegates to constitutional conventions, and so on)
invariably determine the correct valuations to be placed on every-
day life. The proposition is a chilling one-and remains so even
when defended in the context of a generally just legal system. One
can agree, for instance, that the legal system of nineteenth-century
America was generally just without agreeing that it was justifiable
for advocates to provide zealous service for the return of runaway
slaves under the Fugitive Slave Act. Similarly, one can agree that
the Constitution today offers a worthwhile framework for achieving
a just society, but still express skepticism about Supreme Court de-
cisions that make it possible for property interests to eclipse inter-
ests in decent shelter8 2 or that give community control over
education priority over equality of school funding.8 3 Rather than
allow for the invariable propriety of vindicating rights such as these,
it is preferable to suggest that legal rights create morally significant
expectations but that these expectations must be weighed against
other moral interests which, for a variety of reasons, lawmakers
sometimes fail to take into consideration.
A modified version of this blanket justification should be noted
as well, for it might be argued that litigants are at least always mor-
ally entitled to due process of law. If "due process" is said to refer
only to procedures designed to guarantee that deprivations of lib-
erty and property are morally justifiable, then one can of course
agree that zealous service is warranted on this score. However, if
the term is given the broader meaning accorded it in case law-that
is, if due process is said to mean that even when a deprivation is
morally proper, a person may use all legal advantages available to
avoid that deprivation 84 -then invocation of the term can function
as a smokescreen to obscure the fact that aid has been provided to
help a person secure an unjustifiable result. When due process is
defined in this broader sense, a blanket justification framed in terms
of due process is grounded in the mistake noted in the previous
82 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
83 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
84 Due process, the Supreme Court has stated, requires that an individual be accorded
the legal rights available to him in the settled course ofjudicial proceedings of his jurisdic-
tion. See Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894); Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692,
697 (1891). If the rights ajurisdiction accords an individual are deemed insufficient under
either the fifth or fourteenth amendments, due process may then require more than the
minimum just stated. "Due process" thus has at least two normative meanings: it is
designed to vindicate expectations generated by already existing laws, and is designed as
well to provide a benchmark for determining the procedural fairness of those laws. While
both meanings are implicated here, it is the first that is of primary concern.
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paragraph in that it confers on lawmakers the authority to deter-
mine moral valuations that advocates must then realize. The legal
rights created by lawmakers may be desirable more often than not.
But to suggest that realization of these rights is invariably justifiable
ignores the significance of the distinction between legal and moral
justifiability. Thus, while due process, when narrowly defined, can
provide a blanket justification for advocate attempts to prevent un-
justifiable deprivations of liberty or property, it offers no such pro-
tection when it is said to include the opportunity to exploit all legal
advantages accompanying a claim.
Alternatively, a blanket justification might focus on the desira-
bility of encouraging individuals not to resort to self-help remedies.
One might argue that an effectively functioning legal system is nec-
essary for providing morally justifiable results, that such a system is
possible only if laypersons are sufficiently confident about realizing
their legal rights that they will foreswear self-help remedies, and
that advocates thus promote the possibility of justifiable results in
the long run by pursuing unjustifiable ones in the short run. If,
however, resort to self-help results from a breakdown of confidence
about realizing legal rights, why has this not happened in the large
number of cases in which poor and middle class litigants have been
denied access on financial grounds?8 5 Refusal of service for this
reason is far more common than refusal (whether qualified or com-
plete) is ever likely to be because of the prospect of ineffective
screening. Yet the consequences of financial refusal have hardly
been calamitous in this respect. This is not to suggest that financial
refusal is itself desirable. Arguably, service should never be refused
on financial grounds, although the possibility of greater social fric-
tion because of increased litigation should not be ignored. Only
the consequences of financial refusal are at stake here, though, and
since this kind of refusal has not triggered massive resort to self-
help, it is hard to see why conscientious refusal would.
Finally, it might be argued that claim-advancement is justifiable
as long as some other advocate would be likely to pursue a harmful
result. Two objections apply to this kind of lowest-common-de-
nominator justification. One is that this approach makes it impossi-
ble to test the efficacy of conscientious refusal. Admittedly, some
refused litigants will always succeed in finding less scrupulous advo-
cates for their claims. Many others, however, while initially shocked
by a lawyer's exercise of conscience, might ultimately agree to the
85 The American Bar Association's survey of the legal needs of the public has docu-
mented a wide range of civil law problems that individuals do not take to lawyers. Some of
these are resolved via discussion among the interested lay parties; many, however, are sim-
ply allowed to lapse. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1974). See also
Project, The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, 1969 DUKE LJ. 495.
[Vol. 61:36
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
qualifications the lawyers they consult propose for service-a point
that can be investigated only by avoiding a lowest-common-denom-
inator approach to representation. Second, even if litigants could
always find more accommodating lawyers, the fact that they could
do so would not by itself provide a moral justification for offering
service on the same terms as less scrupulous advocates. A distinc-
tion is needed in this context between pursuit of lesser evils and
pursuit of equal ones. That some advocates might accept the risk of
harm by providing unqualified access to the adversary system does
not justify a conscientious advocate's willingness to take the same
risk. If conduct is wrong for one advocate, then it must, barring
some morally relevant distinction, be wrong for others as well.
This said, it should be noted that while an equal-evil justifica-
tion must be rejected, instances sometimes arise in which a lesser-
evil approach can be persuasive. That is, if it were certain a litigant
would seek and find an advocate willing to exploit all the advan-
tages accompanying a claim, it nght be justifiable to agree to ex-
ploit only some of these advantages in order to make sure others
were not exploited. To argue for this, though, simply endorses one
version of qualified access, since "equal evil" would have to be de-
fined in terms of results less scrupulous advocates would pursue
and "lesser evil" would involve a qualification of access by compari-
son with that. A lesser evil approach thus cannot provide a blanket
justification for zealous advocacy while an equal evil one lacks merit
as a moral justification.
D. Blanket Justification for Criminal Defense Advocacy
Even if one were to agree with the points made so far-with the
theory of accountability, with the proposition that perspectival diffi-
culties are sometimes superable, with the rejection of blanket justi-
fications for advocacy-one might nonetheless argue that
conclusive reasons can be provided against refusal within certain
specialties practiced by advocates. The distinction at stake here in-
volves the justifiability of an advocate's conduct as an advocate, as
opposed to its justifiability in the context of some substantive
branch of law. A distinction such as this could serve as the basis for
a specialty-limited claim of blanket justifiability, one that avoids the
unconvincing reasons just mentioned for advocacy in general and
instead points to features of a branch of law that could justify never
refusing service to litigants with claims falling within that special
area. Most branches of law, however, lack unique features that
could support reasons for always representing individuals with
claims within those branches. In any case, given the harmful side
effects that can flow from zealous advancement of a claim, it would
19851
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
be particularly difficult to justify unqualified provision of service
within most branches of law.
The possibility of a limited blanket justification need not occa-
sion concern, then, as a means of generating a piecemeal attack
whose cumulative effect justifies the unqualified provision of service
in every specialty of law. There is, however, one specialty-crimi-
nal defense advocacy-for which the possibility of a blanket justifi-
cation does deserve serious consideration. One can plausibly
maintain that special features of criminal trials-in particular, the
twin threats of unjustifiable deprivations of liberty and abuses of
government power-are of such critical importance that they can
generate blanket moral justifications for zealous criminal advocacy.
This kind of advocacy, one might argue, does not run counter to
the principles advanced in this article. Instead, defense advocacy
could be said to stand apart from these principles in that unique
features of the criminal process offer conclusive reasons for provid-
ing zealous service for defendants even though such reasons cannot
be found for advocacy in general. It is on the question of whether
the special factors just cited provide grounds for zealous service in
all criminal cases that careful analysis is required.
This question is best posed in light of a type of situation that
has long troubled critics of criminal defense advocacy-one in
which an advocate exploits all legal advantages available to a client
when the advocate knows or has sound reason to know that the cli-
ent is guilty of at least one of the crimes (or one of its lesser-in-
cluded offenses) charged. The argument developed in the previous
sections of this article allows for the possibility that zealous advo-
cacy can be appropriate in such situations. In considering the jus-
tifiabilty of his conduct in a context such as this, an advocate might
decide, for instance, that the state had engaged in conduct so
wrongful as to warrant dismissal of charges against his client; he
might consider morally unacceptable the severity of the punish-
ment likely to be imposed on his client; or he might conclude that
only by zealously contesting the top charge (concerning which he
might reasonably doubt his client's guilt) would his client be con-
victed and punished fairly for the lesser charge of which his client
actually was guilty. Careful consideration of the third question of
accountability (the question bearing on the justifiability of likely re-
sults of zealous service) could certainly produce any one of these
conclusions, in which case zealous advocacy would be compatible
with conscientious service.
The question that has been raised, though, is whether zealous
advocacy is always justifiable or whether it is only sometimes so, for
if the latter approach is adopted, case-by-case discriminations must
be made concerning the appropriateness of zealous advocacy. The
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question is best approached by considering two kinds of justifica-
tions mentioned earlier. One of these-protecting defendants from
unjustifiable deprivations of liberty-falls under the more general
heading of defendant-based justifications. The other-which fo-
cuses on the threat to the public of oppressive action by govern-
ment officials-can be treated as citizen-based justifications (that is,
as justifications that retain their force even when convincing moral
reasons cannot be found for arguing the causes of individual
defendants).
The first kind ofjustification raises critical problems of defini-
tion. If, for instance, advocates are said to act justifiably whenever
they try to protect defendants against deprivations of liberty, then
all criminal defense advocacy can be said to fall within the scope of
this justificatory rule. When defined in this way, though, the justifi-
cation lacks moral force since the key moral issue with respect to a
deprivation of liberty is not whether it is threatened, but whether
the threat and actuality are deserved. If, on the other hand, the
justification is framed in terms of protecting defendants against un-
justifiable deprivations of liberty, then it of course should be given
blanket effect when relevant. However, one has to note that this
justificatory rule is unlikely to be relevant in all situations where
criminal defendants are represented.
Limitations in the covering power ofjustifications are encoun-
tered in other formulae that can be proposed in defendant-based
justifications. Criminal defense advocates sometimes try to justify
their conduct, for instance, by arguing that they protect individuals
against indignities that might be inflicted during the criminal pro-
cess, or that they protect individuals who might otherwise be con-
victed because of popular prejudice against them. The presence of
these factors warrants zealous advocacy. However, as with the un-
justifiable deprivation of liberty standard, these rationales for zeal-
ous service are fundamentally limited. Far from providing
justifications for zealous service in all instances, they actually point
in the opposite direction-that is, toward qualified access in which
an advocate agrees to offer zealous protection of the basic human
interests at stake (protection against unjustifiable punishment, and
so on), but declines to exploit advantages that carry a high likeli-
hood of yielding results that benefit defendants but are morally in-
defensible. Defendant-based justifications, it can thus be
suggested, can be viewed in one of two ways. On the one hand,
they can produce standards that allow for the exploitation of advan-
tages without regard to moral considerations, in which case they
cover all instances of zealous advocacy but lack moral force. On the
other hand, they can produce standards that are morally convinc-
ing, in which case they have moral force but cannot cover all in-
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stances of zealous advocacy. Given this difficulty, they cannot
provide blanket moral justifications for criminal defense advocacy.
Citizen-based justifications, by contrast, at least appear com-
patible with the invariable zealous exploitation of advantages on
behalf of guilty clients. Since the touchstone of justification in this
context is the benefit the public realizes by virtue of advocacy, ques-
tions about the justifiability of results obtained for specific defend-
ants need not occasion concern. Rather, attention must focus on
the deterrent effect that zealous advocacy can have on future gov-
ernment conduct. Given the importance of deterrence for this ap-
proach, it could be suggested that the more wrongful a defendant's
own conduct (and thus the more government officials are tempted
to cut procedural corners to convict him), the more important it is
to challenge the government to deter oppressive government con-
duct toward future suspects. An argument along these lines would
lack persuasive force when applied to advocacy for defendants in
civil cases. The diversity of civil plaintiffs is too great and their
power too slight to make a deterrence rationale credible as a blan-
ket justification in that context. When applied to criminal law,
though, a challenge-the-plaintiff (i.e. the government) rationale
does have some persuasive power, given the government's monop-
oly of the use of legitimate force, and thus the possibility that offi-
cials will abuse this power.
While a citizen-based justification can account for some in-
stances of zealous service on behalf of guilty clients, it can offer a
blanket justification only if zealous service of clients invariably re-
quires challenging the government. A coincidence of identity be-
tween zealous criminal defense advocacy and challenging the
government may at first sight seem attractive when zealous advo-
cacy is defined in terms of exploitation of the advantages accompa-
nying a claim. In fact, though, there is a potential for tension
between these two factors, a potential that Alan Dershowitz-inad-
vertently-makes apparent in his reflections on the nature of
defense advocacy. On the one hand, Dershowitz presents the
citizen-based, challenge-the-government deterrence rationale just
outlined:
The zealous defense attorney is the last bastion of liberty-the
final barrier between an overreaching. government and its citi-
zens. The job of the defense attorney is to challenge the gov-
ernment; to make those in government justify their conduct in
relation to the powerless; to articulate and defend the right of
those who lack the ability or resources to defend themselves.8 6
On the other hand, Dershowitz offers the following guidance (on
86 A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 11, at 415.
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the preceding page) to the lay public for selecting defense
attorneys:
The first and most important rule in selecting the best defense
attorney is to be certain that he or she is interested only in
achieving the best legal result for the client and not in serving
some other personal or professional interest .... 87
Considered together, these passages show the potential for
tension between zealous service on behalf of a client and challeng-
ing the government. If a zealous attorney is "interested only in
achieving the best legal result for [a] client," occasions will arise in
which this can best be accomplished by not challenging the govern-
ment but instead by striking a bargain with it that does not require
it to "justify [in court or elsewhere its] conduct in relation to the
powerless." It is in this sense that Dershowitz's consumer crite-
rion-find a lawyer "interested Only in achieving the best results"
for you-stands in tension with his citizen-based justification for
zealous advocacy. The tension -will not arise on every occasion. For
instance, particularly strong formal advantages can best be ex-
ploited by direct challenges to the government, since these are
likely to result in a dismissal of charges. When, however, advan-
tages are somewhat strong or of uncertain strength, a risk factor
must be taken into account in deciding whether to challenge the
government or whether instead to seek a plea bargain, the effect of
which would be to forgo challenging the government.
From the standpoint of a deterrence rationale, a challenge
would be preferable even when advantages are only somewhat
strong, since the cost to the government of a full-scale challenge
(pre-trial hearings, trial, appeal, collateral attack) would be signifi-
cant no matter what final outcome might result. From a client's
standpoint, on the other hand, zealous advocacy might require a
compromise in which case somewhat strong advantages are ex-
ploited not by challenging the government but by discounting their
value (according to the perceived likelihood of their success in open
court) in reaching a plea bargain. Since this kind of compromise is
frequently reached, zealous advocacy often does not coincide with
the demands of the challenge-the-government rationale. Instead,
even though the public might benefit from a challenge to the gov-
ernment, defense attorneys frequently act zealously by forgoing
this and reaching a settlement that reflects their clients' risk
preferences.
Given the tension just noted, a more modest version of the
challenge-the-government rationale might be suggested. Accord-
ing to this, one would have to concede that challenging the govern-
87 Id. at 414 (emphasis in original).
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ment is sometimes not in the interest of criminal defendants.
Nonetheless, one could argue that whenever these interests do co-
incide, an advocate acts justifiably when he does challenge the gov-
ernment. Even this, however, is unconvincing, for it overlooks two
difficulties raised by the suggestion that the public always benefits
from challenges to the government. The first is that challenges are
available when government misconduct is minor and defendant
conduct, by contrast, profoundly wrongful. Since the public has an
important interest in seeing individual wrongdoing punished and in
deterring such wrongdoing in the future, a citizen-based justifica-
tion that appeals to the public interest would seem to require not a
challenge to the government in situations such as these, but instead
a forgoing of advantages to insure the punishment of a serious
wrongdoer.
Second, not all challenges to the government, it should be
borne in mind, involve misconduct by government agents; in some
instances, challenges are instead aimed at the credibility of wit-
nesses the government must summon in order to satisfy its burden
of proof. Thus, if a defense attorney challenges a complaining wit-
ness he knows to be telling the truth but who nonetheless lacks
credibility, such cross-examination can have a deterrent effect on
the government only by discouraging prosecutors from presenting
cases whose key witnesses will testify truthfully but who lack credi-
bility. Deterrence of prosecution can actually occur in such in-
stances; rapes of prostitutes, for instance, are frequently rejected
for prosecution before they reach the indictment stage.88 What is
deterred, though, is not government misconduct, but instead
prosecutorial effort that would fulfill a legitimate public interest.
One final point about challenging the government should be
noted. The term itself, it should be clear, expresses the core con-
cept of due process when this is applied in a criminal context, so
one would have to conclude that by rejecting the justifiability of
invariably challenging the government, the claim that it is always
justifiable to provide criminal defendants with due process of law
must also be rejected. This conclusion will occasion concern, how-
ever, only if the distinction, developed earlier, between "protec-
tive" and "advantage-exploiting" due process is not borne in mind.
If due process is defined (in a way it is not in the case law) solely in
88 For a survey of prosecutors' attitudes concerning the significance of a complaining
witness's prior contact with a defendant accused of rape, see National Institute of Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice, Forcible Rape: A National Survey of the Responses of Prosecutors
26-27 (1977) (74% of prosecutors responding to questionnaire believed that evidence of
victim's previous sexual contact would have considerable impact onjury). See also H. FEILD
& L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 103 (1980) (no variable more likely to have a decisive effect
in a rape trial than belief of fact finder that complaining witness has a history of unchastity).
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terms of protecting defendants against morally unjustifiable harm,
then it is of course justifiable always to act zealously to provide due
process. If, however, due process is conceived in terms of the ex-
ploitation of advantages that can produce unjustifiable results, then
no moral rationale exists to legitimate its invariable provision to
criminal defendants. Even when advantages can be used to avoid
deserved punishment altogether, there may be good reasons in a
given case to seize them to gain an acquittal or dismissal of charges.
When given its legal meaning, however, due process cannot pro-
vide such a justification. Instead, the justification must be devel-
oped in the context of the facts at hand in a given case. It is in this
sense that moral considerations must be brought to bear on advo-
cacy, and this can occur only when advocates forgo their claims to
special dispensations from moral reasoning by virtue of their role.
III. Conclusion
The final dispensation reviewed here has involved a blanket
justification for advancing claims within the adversary process.
Consideration began, though, with dispensations of an even
broader kind, dispensations designed to shield advocates from even
the possibility of censure for professionally proper conduct. Given
the many steps that were needed to move from one kind of dispen-
sation to the other, it might be helpful by way of conclusion to offer
a schematic overview of the argument that has been advanced con-
cerning accountability and conscientious refusal. Four specific
points were made in developing the argument, and they will be
summarized below in an order slightly different than the one in
which they were presented in the article.
(1) Advocates are accountable for the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of their unconstrained decisions to render service, and so must be pre-
pared to offer moral justifications for decisions made under these conditions.
This must be the starting point for analysis of advocates' moral ac-
countability. As was noted at the outset, many of the lawyers who
have written their memoirs in a confessional mode and even some
of the philosophers who have commented on the ethics of advocacy
have taken it for granted that advocates' conduct must be justified
on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, they have argued past the
legal commentators who have insisted on immunity from moral
censure for professionally proper conduct. Much of this article has
thus involved careful analysis in which arguments designed to pro-
vide advocates with across-the-board dispensations from moral rea-
soning have been tracked down and, when examined, found
wanting. It is in this sense that there is an important congruence
between denials of accountability and blanket justifications for ad-
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vocacy. For while the structure of these claims is different, the ef-
fect of each is to make it unnecessary for advocates to consider the
moral implications of their professional conduct on a case-by-case
basis.
(2) If the adversary system could always prevent the realization of unjus-
tifiable results by functioning as a perfect screening device for claims advanced,
there could be no objection from the standpoint of harm-avoidance to providing
litigants with zealous advocacy. Zealous advocacy, it has been argued
here, is prima facie desirable for two reasons: first, knowledge of its
availability induces laypersons to resolve disputes peacefully; and
second, such advocacy involves a course of conduct (in particular,
exploitation of the legal advantages accompanying a claim) that
most laypersons would undertake for themselves if only they pos-
sessed the skills to do so. These cannot confer more than prima
facie desirability on zealous advocacy, however, in the current ad-
versary system its provision can often contribute to morally unjusti-
fiable harm. In a perfect screening system, by contrast, no such
harm could occur. Thus, while it might be morally preferable for
advocates operating in a perfect screening system to devote them-
selves to one kind of claim rather than another, there could be no
objection, from the standpoint of harm-avoidance, to advocates in a
perfect screening system offering zealous service for any claim they
are asked to advance.
(3) Because common-law adversary systems do not function as perfect
screening devices, advocates must determine the justifiability of their conduct by
resolving the tension that can often arise between the value of providing zeal-
ous service and the undesirable consequences that can result from this service.
This tension does not arise on every occasion. When an advocate
can expect the adversary system to function as an effective screen-
ing device, the tension need not be considered. However, when no
such expectation can reasonably be entertained-that is, when an
unjustifiable result is likely to be achieved-the tension becomes
unavoidable. Arbiters within the adversary system cannot be ex-
pected to consider this tension; in fact, it is because arbiters can on
occasion be either unable or unwilling to prevent the occurrence of
an unjustifiable result that the tension arises in the first place. Ad-
vocates stand out in such circumstances as critically important
moral agents within the adversary system and must decide for
themselves how to strike the balance between access and avoidance
of unjustifiable harm.
(4) If it would be morally indefensible to provide zealous service given
the kind of result likely to be produced, advocates should then refuse to provide
such service. By refusing service, conscientious advocates can offer a
final equitable safeguard against litigants' use of the adversary pro-
cess to achieve unjustifiable results. Advocates have two options, it
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has been suggested, when refusal is warranted. One involves provi-
sion of qualified access to the adversary process (and so requires a
litigant's agreement to waive exploitation of some or perhaps all of
the objectionable advantages accompanying his claim). The sec-
ond, and more drastic, option involves refusal to provide access of
any kind. Since at least something of value results whenever service
is provided, complete refusal must be considered the less desirable
of the two options. It should nonetheless be adopted as a remedy if
a litigant does not agree to an advocate's proposed limitation of
zealous service, or if waiver of the advantages accompanying a
claim would still not make it justifiable to advance the claim. If,
however, a litigant agrees to forgo advantages, then qualified access
will offer the best possible means of resolving the conflicting con-
siderations relevant to advocacy. It will promote the values realized
by providing access and reduce the risk of producing an unjustifi-
able result as a consequence of providing access.
